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L. Introduction
"As the oft-used and oft-quoted maxim for assessing the obvious goes:
'If it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it just
may be a duck.' The notion behind this quote is an irrefutable adage,"' but
one that is seemingly lost on many district courts today who struggle to
either discern or acknowledge the obvious: Private international arbitral
bodies are "tribunals" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) 2 because
they are "first-instance decisionmaker[s]" that conduct adjudicatory
proceedings which lead to a dispositive ruling.3
International commercial arbitration is the "accepted way of resolving
international business disputes [between private parties]." As stated by one
international lawyer, "' [iln today's world the dispute resolution mechanism
will invariably be arbitration."",4 Although there are no empirical studies
compiling statistics on the frequency of arbitration provisions in
1. See Nathan W. Kellum, If It Looks Like a Duck.... TraditionalPublic Forum
Status of Open Areas on Public University Campuses, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 1 (2006)
(applying the Duck Test to traditional public forum status of open areas on campus).
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2006) ("Assistance to foreign and international tribunals
and to litigants before such tribunals.").
3. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258 (2004)
(providing the analytical structure to determine whether an international arbitral body
constitutes a tribunal within the meaning of § 1782(a)).
4. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and
InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 79, 94 (2000) (discussing
the practice of international commercial arbitration and how it relates to private parties).
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international commercial contracts, "[o]ne estimate is that ninety percent of
all international contracts contain arbitration clauses."0
Section 1782 of Title 28 of the United States Code grants U.S. district
courts the authority to provide discovery assistance to international and
foreign tribunals.6 One scholar provided a succinct overview of § 1782's
powerful scope: "This statute boldly authorizes the use of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure-specifically, the rules governing the discovery of
documents and information in U.S. federal courts-to assist a 'foreign
tribunal' . . . with securing documents or deposition testimony from persons
or entities present . .. in the United States.0
Congress first provided judicial assistance to foreign tribunals in 1855
through the use of letters rogatory via diplomatic channels.8 Over the next
100 years, congressional amendments broadened the ability of U.S. courts
to provide judicial assistance by eliminating previous statutory
requirements. 9 "In the late 1950s, Congress acknowledged that an increase
in international commercial and financial transactions required a
'comprehensive study' of the optimal level of judicial assistance." 10
Congress created the Commission on International Rules of Judicial
Procedure (International Rules Commission) to investigate and recommend
improvements to U.S. and foreign judicial assistance practices."1
In 1964, Congress adopted the International Rules Commission's
suggested legislation, which resulted in a complete revision of § 1782.
"One of the most notable amendments was that federal district courts could
order the production of documents or testimony 'for use in a proceeding in
5. Id
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) ("Assistance to foreign and international tribunals and to
litigants before such tribunals.").
7. See Pedro J. Martinez-Fraga, The Future of 28 US. C. § 1782: The Continued
Advance Of American-Style Discovery in International Commercial Arbitration, 64 U.
MIAMI L. Ruv. 89, 89 (2009) (noting "the most salient, significant, and uniquely American
contribution to private procedural international law is embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a)"); 28
U.S.C. § 1782(a) ("The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may
order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use
in a proceeding in a foreign or international trbunal. .. .)
8. See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 247 (providing the historical and political context of
the 1964 Amendments to § 1782).
9. See Anna Conley, A New World of Discovery: The Ramifications of Two Recent
Federal Courts' Decisions Granting Judicial Assistance to Arbitral Tribunals Pursuant to
28 U S.C. § 1782, 17 Am. REv. INT'L ARB. 45, 47 (2006) (providing the historical and
political developments leading up to the 1964 Amendments to § i1782).
10. Id.
11. Id. (citations omitted).
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a foreign or international tribunal."02 This quoted language replaced
judicial proceedings "pending in any court in a foreign country with which
the United States is at peace."'13 In its current form, § 1782(a) reads as
follows: "The district court of the district in which a person resides or is
found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a
document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or
international tribunal, including criminal investigations conducted before
formal accusation....
Currently, the district courts are split on the statutory meaning of
"tribunal." Specifically, the district courts are split on the issue of whether
private international arbitral bodies constitute a tribunal under § 1782.15
This Note attempts to answer the question of whether private international
arbitral bodies constitute an "international tribunal" within the meaning of
§ 1782. Hans Smit, the "dominant drafter"'16 of the 1964 amendments, takes
a clear position, which this Note adopts: "[Tihe word 'tribunal,' clearly
encompass[es] private arbitral tribunals . .. [T]he choice of that term was
deliberate so as to depart from the text used in the legislation that was
amended .... ~1
When district courts fail to recognize private international arbitral
tribunals as § 1782 "tribunals," it deprives would-be § 1782 petitioners
from potential documents that can, at times, be dispositive to the
adjudication outcome.'18 This Note argues that depriving parties from
12. Id. (emphasis in original).
13. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 248 (noting the
political efforts made by Congress to expand § 1782 (emphasis added)).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
15. Compare Norfolk S. Corp. v. Ace Bermuda Ltd., 626 F. 5upp. 2d 882, 886 (N.D.
111. 2009) (holding that private arbitral tribunals do not fall within the definition the Supreme
Court embraced in its Intel dictum), with In re Application of Roz Trading Ltd., 469 F.
Supp. 2d 1221, 1228 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (holding that when applying Intel's analysis, private
international arbitral bodies constitute a tribunal within the statutory construction of § 1782).
16. In re Letter of Request from Crown Prosecution Service of United Kingdom, 870
F.2d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
17. See Hans Smit, American JudicialAssistance to International Arbitral Tribunals,
8 Am. REV. INT'L Attn. 153, 155 (1997) (noting that he drafted the 1964 Amendments to
§ 1782 and that Congress adopted those amendments wholesale and without change).
18. See Posting of Lucy Reed, KLuwER ARBiTRATION BLoG (Feb. 3, 2009),
http://luwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/02/03/us-discovery-in-aid-of-intemationalarbitration-recent-developments! (last visited Nov. 15, 2010) ("Parties involved in foreign
litigation have a powerful U.S. discovery tool at their disposal in 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).") (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). It is hard to determine what impact the
discovered documents have in an arbitral proceeding because most of these proceedings are
not of public record. However, some District Courts have alluded to the dispositive effect
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discoverable material is precisely what Congress intended to prevent.' 9
Specifically, when Congress amended § 1782 it did so to "improve judicial
assistance between the United States and foreign countries.",20 In other
words, if there are discoverable materials in the United States that can help
a foreign tribunal, then the district court should allow discovery.'
Admittedly, this discovery device could prove too powerful and
cumbersome, diminishing its value to the system.2 Section 1782 discovery
could be used to delay proceedings and increase litigation costs.2 Such
inefficiency, many courts and scholars argue, will force parties to settle.2
Meaning, if courts interpret § 1782 to include international arbitral bodies,
then all of the fundamental policies behind international arbitration
agreements would be undermined .2 5 These policy concerns are legitimate.
But, as this Note argues in Part VIII, the Supreme Court has already
provided a sound analytical framework to address these concerns in Intel
Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.2
§ 1782 has on the preliminary issue whether or not to compel arbitration in the first place.
See, e.g., In re Application of Babcock Borsig AG, 583 F. Supp. 2d 233, 235 (D. Mass.
2008) (discussing the factual background and the petitioner's use of § 1782); Joseph Landau,
Muscular Procedure: Conditional Deference in the Executive Detention Cases, 84 WASH.
L. REv. 661, 687 n. 135 (noting "[o]ne little-known procedural device that could be especially
useful for obtaining exculpatory evidence is 28 U.S.C. § 1782, a statute commonly used in
international commercial litigation. Detainees could try to invoke Section 1782 to subpoena
documents from U.S. personnel who would be otherwise immune." (emphasis added)).
19. See infra Part V (discussing the intention and meaning of the 1964 Amendments to

§ 1782).
20. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258 (2004)
The Rules
("Section 1782 had previously referred to 'any judicial proceeding.'
Commission's draft, which Congress adopted, replaced that term with 'a proceeding in a
foreign or international tribunal.' Congress understood that change to 'provide the
possibility of U.S. judicial assistance in connection with administrative and quasi-judicial
proceedings abroad."' (citations omitted)).
21. See id. at 266 (holding "that since § 1782(a) authorizes, but does not require,
discovery assistance, we leave it to the courts below to ensure an airing adequate to
determine what, if any, assistance is appropriate").
22. See Republic of Kazakthstan v. Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir.
1999) ("Empowering arbitrators or, worse, the parties, in private international disputes to
seek ancillary discovery through the federal courts -does not benefit the arbitration process.").
23. See id ("Arbitration is intended as a speedy, economical, and effective means of
dispute resolution.").
24. See id. ("Resort to § 1782 in the teeth of such agreements suggests a party's
attempt to manipulate United States court processes for tactical advantage.").
25. See id ("The course of the litigation before us suggests that arbitration's principal
advantages may be destroyed if the parties succumb to fighting over burdensome discovery
requests far from the place of arbitration.").
26. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258 (2004)
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Additionally, many scholars and courts argue that although private
international arbitral bodies have all the distinctive characteristics of an
adjudicatory tribunal, they are still not a "tribunal" within the meaning of
§ 1782.2 Despite the Supreme Court's recognition that § 1782 is to be
interpreted expansively, some district courts have taken a restrictive
approach and conclude that Congress's 1964 amendments to § 1782 were
In reaching this
meant to include only public international tribunals.2
conclusion, district courts, and supporting scholars, base their arguments on
the policy rationales discussed above (litigation expenses, costs, delay, and
settlement).2 In other words, their arguments are contingent primarily on
the policy rationales behind international arbitration agreements.3
This Note argues that the district courts' reliance on policy as the
decisive factor in determining whether a private international arbitral body
constitutes a § 1782 "tribunal" is misguided and misplaced .31' Relevant
policy concerns should be considered when the district court is determining
whether or not to exercise its discretion, but not in determining what
constitutes a tribunal. 2 Additionally, reliance on policy concerns in
determining what constitutes a tribunal makes very little sense in light of
the analytical framework provided by the Court in Intel, 3 the legislative
(holding that the DG-Competition is a tribunal under § 1782 because the tribunal is a "firstinstance decisionrnaker[]" that conducts proceedings which lead to a dispositive ruling). The
Intel Court also provided a discretionary guidance test, which provides several factors a
district court should consider when exercising its discretion. Id. at 264.
27. See Norfolk S. Corp. v. Ace Bermuda Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 2d 882, 885 (N.D. 1ll.
2009) (concluding that "[w~hile the private arbitral tribunal at issue here likely falls within
the scope of 'all bodies exercising adjudicatory powers"' it still is not a tribunal under
§ 1782 because of the purpose of international arbitration agreements).
28. See In re Application of Babcock Borsig AG, 583 F. Supp. 2d 233, 239-40 (D.
Mass. 2008) ("[Tlhe Court in Intel emphasized Congress's intent to expand the applicable
scope of § 1782(a). The Court noted Congress's use of the broad term 'tribunal,' and it
favorably quoted Professor Smit's definition of the term, which expressly included 'arbitral
tribunals. "').
29. See Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir.
1999) ("Arbitration is intended as a speedy, economical, and effective means of dispute
resolution.").
30. See infra Part IV (noting that the courts who have held private intemnational
arbitral bodies do not constitute a 'tribunal' under § 1782 give dispositive weight to policy
although loosely referencing the statutory history of § 1782 and the Intel opinion).
31. See infra Part VII (providing a succinct overview of the policy rationales and
noting that these rationales should be considered when the court exercises their discretion).
32. See infra Part VIII (proposing a comprehensive solution that will provide a sound
judicial analytical framework when dealing with § 1782 petitions).
33. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258 (2004)
(holding that the DG-Competition is a tribunal under § 1782 because the tribunal is a "first-
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history of the 1964 amendments to § 1782,"~ and the "dominant drafter"
Hans Smit's interpretation of § 1782 .35 All three sources include private
international arbitral bodies within the scope of § 1782.3
The discussion below proceeds as follows: Part 11 of this Note
provides the interpretive framework for § 1782 petitions before Intel was
decided. Specifically, this Part discusses two Federal Court of Appeals
Circuit Court decisions which held that private international tribunals did
not constitute a "tribunal" under § 1782.~ Part III provides a succinct
overview of the Supreme Court's decision in Intel. Particular attention is
given to the Court's conclusion on why the disputed arbitral body
constituted a tribunal, and the discretionary guidance test the Court
established.3
Part IV provides the jurisprudential split that has arisen
among district courts in navigating § 1782 post-Intel. Part V describes Han
Smit's role in drafting the 1964 Congressional amendments and how Smit's
scholarship influenced the Court's decision in Intel. Also, this Part argues
that both the legislative history and Hans Smit's scholarship contemplate
private international arbitral tribunals as being within the scope of § 1782. 39
Part VI provides the legislative history behind the 1964 amendments,
emphasizing the wholesale adoption of Hans Smit's work by Congress.
Part VII provides a concise overview of the policies behind international
instance decisionmaker" that conducts proceedings which lead to a dispositive ruling).
34. See infra Part VI (noting that the 1964 Amendments are meant to be interpreted
expansively and inclusively).
35. See Hans Smit, InternationalLitigation Under the United States Code, 65 CoLuM.
L. REv. 1015, 1026 n.71 (1965) ('The term 'tribunal' embraces all bodies exercising
adjudicatory powers, and includes investigating magistrates, administrative and arbitral
tribunals, and quasi-judicial agencies, as well as conventional civil, commercial, criminal,
and administrative courts."); see also infra Part VIII (proposing a workable definition of
what constitutes a tribunal under § 1782).
36. See infra Part VI (discussing the legislative history and Professor Hans Smit's law
review article).
37. See Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc. v. Bear Steams & Co., Inc., 165 F.3d 184, 190 (2d Cir.
1999) (holding § 1782(a) only "cover[s] governmental or intergovernmental arbitral
tribunals and conventional courts and other state-sponsored adjudicatory bodies" and not
private arbitral tribunals); Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d 880, 883
(5th Cir. 1999) (holding "the term 'foreign and international tribunals' in § 1782 was not
intended to authorize resort to United States federal courts to assist discovery in private
international arbitrations").
38. See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 258 (holding that the DG-Competition is a tribunal
under § 1782 because the tribunal is a "first-instance decisionmaker" that conducts
proceedings which lead to a dispositive ruling).
39. See Smit, supra note 35, at 1026 (discussing the interpretive framework of § 1782
and his understanding of what constitutes a tribunal).
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arbitration provisions and argues that district courts' reliance on policy is
misguided and misplaced when concluding private international arbitral
tribunals are not within the scope of § 1782.
Finally, to resolve the district court split, Part VIII proposes a
comprehensive solution that provides a sound judicial framework for
analyzing § 1782 petitions. The starting point to this solution is to provide
a workable definition of what constitutes a "tribunal." This Note argues
that the analytical framework in Intel provides a two-prong test to
determine what constitutes a tribunal: (1) whether the international arbitral
bodies are "first-instance decisionmaker[s];" and (2) whether the arbitral
body conducts adjudicatory proceedings that lead to a dispositive ruling.4
Next, Part VIII provides a two-step judicial framework to determine
whether or not to grant a § 1782 petition. First, district courts should ensure
Second, district
basic § 1782 statutory required elements are satisfied.4
exercising their
when
test
guidance
discretionary
Intel's
courts should apply
42
discretion in deciding § 1782 petitions. This step is the appropriate place
to advance the policy rationales underlying international arbitration
agreements. Lastly, Part VIII proposes a statutory amendment to § 1782
which would require district courts to make specific findings when
exercising their discretion.
I. Pre-Intel: Section 1 782(a)'s InterpretiveFramework
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and Fifth Circuits
were the first appellate courts to address the scope of § 1782. Particularly,
both courts were asked whether or not, under § 1782(a), "foreign and
international tribunals" included private international commercial arbitral
40. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258 (2004)
(providing the two prongs this Note adopts as the test to determine what constitutes a
tribunal under § 1782).
41. See Esses v. Hanania, 101 F.3d 873, 875 (2d Cir. 1996) (explaining the elements
as "(1) that the person from whom discovery is sought reside (or be found) in the distict ...
to which the application is made, (2) ... discovery be for use in a proceeding before a
foreign tribunal, and (3). ...be made by a foreign or international tribunal or 'any interested
person"').
42. See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 264 (noting "a district court is not required to grant a
§ 1782(a) discovery application simply because it has the authority to do so" and providing
factors that should bear consideration in ruling on a § 1782(a) request).
43. See Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 1999)
(discussing the scope of § 1782); Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d 880,
883 (5th Cir. 1999) (same).
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bodies."4
Both courts ruled that § 1782 does not include private
international arbitral bodies .4 ' These opinions are critical because their
precedential value is a source of the current split among the district courts. 46
Specifically, district courts are split on whether or not Intel overruled the
Second and Fifth Circuit decisions.4 Part VIII of this Note argues that Intel
overruled both Circuits' decisions.4
In NationalBroadcasting Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc. ,49 TV Azteca
S.A. de C.V. (Azteca) and National Broadcasting Company (NBC) entered
into a contract which contained an arbitration provision. 50 Under the terms
of the provision, any dispute between NBC and Azteca would be arbitrated
in Mexico by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) under ICC
rules and Mexican law .5 1 After Azteca initiated arbitration against NBC for
failure to perform under the contract, NBC applied to the Southern District
of New York for authorization under § 1782 to serve document subpoenas
on third-party financial institutions that had assisted Azteca. 12 The court
granted the request, and Azteca and the financial institutions subsequently
moved to quash the subpoenas.5 The district court's decision noted that the
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2006) ("The district court of the district in which a
person resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a
document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international trbunal. ... )
45. See Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc., 165 F.3d at 190 (holding § 1782(a) only "cover[s]
governmental or intergovernmental arbitral tribunals and conventional courts and other statesponsored adjudicatory bodies' and not private arbitral tribunals); Republic of Kazakhstan,
168 F.3d at 883 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[Tlhe term 'foreign and international tribunals' in § 1782
was not intended to authorize resort to United States federal courts to assist discovery in
private international arbitrations.").
46. See infra Part IV (discussing the current district court split and the precedential
treatment of NBC and Republic of Kazakhstan).
47. Compare Comisi6n Ejecutiva, Hidroel~ctrica del Rio Lempa v. El Paso Corp., 617
F. Supp. 2d 481, 485 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (noting that Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann
Int'l is still good law that the court is bound to follow), with In re Application of Babcock
Borsig AG, 583 F. Supp. 2d 233, 240 (D. Mass. 2008) ("1 do not find the reasoning in
National BroadcastingCo. and Republic of Kazakhstan to be persuasive, particularly in light
of the subsequent Supreme Court decision in Intel.").
48. See infra Part VIII (proposing a comprehensive solution which argues that
National Broadcasting Co. and Republic of Kazakhstan are overruled by Intel).
49. See Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc. v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., 165 F.3d 184, 190 (2d Cir.
1999) (holding § 1782(a) only "coveris] governmental or intergovernmental arbitral
tribunals and conventional courts and other state-sponsored adjudicatory bodies" and not
private arbitral tribunals).
50. See id. at 186 (discussing the factual background).
5 1. Id.
5 2. Id.
53. Id.
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issue of whether or not a private commercial arbitration tribunal, such as
the ICC, constitutes a "tribunal" under § 1782 "emerged only recently"
despite the fact that "the Statute was adopted in 1964."04 The district court
held that § 1782 did not apply to private commercial arbitration and granted
the motion to quash."5
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that "Congress did not
intend for [§ 1782] to apply to an arbitral body established by private
parties."0 6 According to the congressional reports, the court noted "the
word 'tribunal' is used to make it clear that assistance is not confined to
proceedings before conventional courts."5 Looking at the context of these
reports, however, the court concluded that the authors were referring only
to governmental entities, such as administrative or investigative courts,
acting as state instrumentalities or with the authority of the state.5" The
court further noted that "[t~he absence of any reference to private dispute
resolution proceedings such as arbitration strongly suggests that Congress
did not consider them in drafting the statute."5 9 Moreover, "[t]he legislative
history's silence with respect to private tribunals is especially telling
because we are confident that a significant congressional expansion of
American judicial assistance to international arbitral panels created
exclusively by private parties would not have been lightly undertaken by
Congress .. . .00' The court's narrow reading of the legislative history is
extremely problematic. As Parts V and VI of this Note argue, the 1964
amendments were design to expand the scope of § 1782. 61
54. In re Application of Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc., No. M-77 (RWS), 1998 WL 19994, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1998).
55. See id at *6 ('[T]here is no evidence in the legislative history, including the
congressional committee reports, the contemporaneous articles written by the director of the
Project assisting the legislation drafting commission, or the statutes preceding the current
version of the Statute to suggest that private commercial arbitrations were even
contemplated by Congress.").
56. Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc. v. Bear Steams & Co., Inc., 165 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir.
1999).
57. See id. at 189 (discussing the legislative history of the 1964 Amendments to
§ 1782).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 190.
61. See In re Application of Babcock Borsig AG, 583 F. Supp. 2d 233, 239-40 (D.
Mass. 2008) ("[Tlhe Court in Intel emphasized Congress's intent to expand the applicable
scope of § 1782(a). The Court noted Congress's use of the broad term 'tribunal,' and it
favorably quoted Professor Smit's definition of the term, which expressly included 'arbitral
tribunals. "').
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The court further determined, because of legislative silence, that policy
cuts against including private international arbitral bodies within the scope
of § 1782.6 The court stated that the "popularity of arbitration rests in
considerable part on its asserted efficiency and cost-effectivenesscharacteristics said to be at odds with full-scale litigation in the courts, and
especially at odds with the broad-ranging discovery made possible by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.0 3 The court's policy based rationale is
misplaced in light of Intel's analytical framework 6 4 Policy considerations
are legitimate concerns that all courts should consider when exercising their
discretion, but not when determining what constitutes a tribunal.6
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached a similar decision in
Kazakhstan
Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann International.6
District
of
Texas,
pursuant
to
§
1782,
to order a
petitioned the Southern
nonparty to submit to a deposition and produce documents for use in an
arbitration between Kazakhstan and Biedermann International. 7 The
arbitration was before the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber
of Commerce.6 The district court granted the request, holding that § 1782
applies to private international arbitration.6
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that "the term 'foreign
and international tribunals' in § 1782 was not intended to authorize resort to
United States federal courts to assist discovery in private international
arbitrations.0 0 The court concluded that "[t]here is no contemporaneous
evidence that Congress contemplated extending § 1782 to the then-novel
arena of international commercial arbitration.07 1 Furthermore, "[r]eferences
62. See Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc. v. Bear Steams & Co., Inc., 165 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir.
1999) ("In sum, policy considerations of some magnitude reinforce our conclusion. . .
63. Id at 190-91.
64. See infra Part III (providing a succinct overview of the analytical framework
provided by the Intel Court).
65. See infra Part VIII (proposing a comprehensive solution that will provide a sound
judicial analytical framework when dealing with § 1782 petitions).
66. See Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir.
1999) (concluding that § 1782 "was enlarged to further comity among nations, not to
complicate and undermine the salutary device of private international arbitration").
67. See id. at 881 (discussing the factual background).
68. Id.
69. See In re Republic of Kazakhstan, 33 F. Supp. 2d 567, 568 (S.D. Tex. 1998),
overruled by Republic of Kazakhstan, 168 F.3d at 883 ("Biedermann says that the statute's
term 'foreign or international tribunal' does not include commercial arbitration. The statute
covers commercial arbitration by its plain meaning, informed by conmmon sense.").
70. Republic of Kazakhstan, 168 F.3d at 883.
71. See id. at 882 (providing a detailed discussion of the legislative history behind the

1670

17067
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1659 (2010)

in the United States Code to 'arbitral tribunals' almost uniformly concern
an adjunct of a foreign government or international agency."7 2 In other
words, "foreign and international tribunals" only include "international
3
government-sanctioned tribunals.0
In an attempt to bolster their loosely based statutory argument, the
court gave an exposition on the policies behind international arbitration
agreements.7 The court stated that "[e]mpowering arbitrators or, worse, the
parties, in private international disputes to seek ancillary discovery through
the federal courts does not benefit the arbitration process. Arbitration is
intended as a speedy, economical, and effective means of dispute
resolution. 7 5
The court further noted that "arbitration's principal
advantages may be destroyed if the parties succumb to fighting over
burdensome discovery requests far from the place of arbitration ...
Resort to § 1782. ...
suggests a party's attempt to manipulate United States
court processes for tactical advantage."7 6 Thus, the court concluded that
§ 1782 was enlarged to further comity among nations, not to complicate
and undermine the salutary device of private international arbitration.7
This argument made very little sense then 7 ' and makes even less sense now
in light of Intel's analytical framework . 79 As Parts VII and VIII argue,
policy considerations are legitimate concerns when the court is exercising
their discretion to extend discovery, but not in determining what constitutes
a tribunal under § 1782.

1964 Amendments to § 1782).
72. Id.
73. See id ('But the new version of § 1782 was drafted to meld its predecessor with
other statutes which facilitated discovery for international government-sanctioned
tribunals.").
74. See id. (providing the policy rationales of international commercial arbitration).
75. Id at 883.
76. Id
77. Id
78. See Smit, supra note 35, at 1026 (discussing how Congress intended to expand the
scope of§ 1782).
79. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258 (2004)
(providing an analytical framework to determine what constitutes a tribunal and providing
factors which should be considered when the district court is exercising its discretion under
§ 1782).
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11. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.: The U.S. Supreme
Court Weighs In
In Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,80 the Supreme Court
In the underlying dispute,
issued its first opinion interpreting § 1782.8
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (ADM) filed an antitrust complaint against
Intel Corporation (Intel) with the Directorate-General for Competition of
the Commission of the European Communities (DG-Competition) . 82 DG83
Competition is the European Union's "primary antitrust law enforcer.,
AMD asked the DG-Competition to seek discovery of documents that Intel
had produced in litigation against Intergraph Corporation (Intergraph) in the
Northern District of Alabama.84 The DG-Competition declined AMD's
request. 8 5 After the DG-Competition declined AMD's request, AMD
petitioned the District Court for the Northern District of California pursuant
to § 1782 for an order directing Intel to produce documents discovered in
the Intergraph litigation for use in connection with the complaint it had filed
The district court denied AMD's § 1782
with the DG-Competition.
request on the ground that DG-Competition was not an adjudicative body.8
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and
The Ninth Circuit held that,
remanded for a decision on the merits.8
because the decisions of the DG-Competition can be appealed to the Court
of First Instance and then the European Court of Justice, "the proceeding
for which discovery is sought is, at minimum, one leading to quasi judicial

80. See id (holding that the DG-Competition is a tribunal under § 1782).
81. See id. at 253 (noting that the Court granted certiorari to determine several issues
involving the scope of § 1782).
82. See id. at 246 (discussing the factual background).
83. Id. at 250.
84. Id.at 251.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., No. C-01-7033 MISC WAI,
2002 WL 1339088, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2002), overruled by Advanced Micro Devices,
Inc. v. Intel Corp., 292 F.3d 664, 669 (9th Cir. 2002) ("A 'proceeding' within the meaning of
§ 1782 means one in which an 'adjudicative function is exercised.,").
88. See Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 292 F.3d 664, 669 (9th Cir.
2002) ("The district court's determination that the proceeding for which AMD seeks
discovery does not qualify under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 is reversed.").
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proceedings. 819 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve several
issues under § 1782.90
First, the Court was asked to determine whether AMD constituted an
"interested person" under § 1782.91 Intel argued that the "catalog of
'interested persons' authorized to apply for judicial assistance under
§ 1782(a) includes only 'litigants, foreign sovereigns, and the designated
agents of those sovereigns,' and excludes AMD, a mere complainant before
the [DG-Competition]." 92 The Court, quoting an article by Hans Smit,
rejected this argument and held "'any interested person' is 'intended to
include not only litigants before foreign or international tribunals, but also
foreign and international officials as well as any other person whether he be
designated by foreign law or international convention or merely possess a
reasonable interest in obtaining the assistance."'90 3 In other words, an
interested person is any person with a reasonable interest in obtaining
judicial assistance.9 Meaning, any person with a reasonable interest in
obtaining judicial assistance can request § 1782 discovery. 95
Next, the Court was asked to determine whether a proceeding before a
foreign tribunal needs to be pending or at least imminent for an applicant to

invoke § 1782 successfully. 96 Intel argued that because AMD's complaint
had not yet progressed beyond the investigative stage before the DGCompetition, there was no pending or imminent adjudicative action.9 The
Court, again citing Hans Smit's article, held that "§ 1782(a) requires only
that a dispositive ruling. ...be within reasonable contemplation." 98 The
Court reasoned that "timn 1964, when Congress eliminated the requirement
that a proceeding be 'judicial,' Congress also deleted the requirement that a

89. See id at 665 ("Because we conclude that the proceeding for which the discovery
at issue is sought meets the statutory definition, we reverse the district court.").
90. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 253 (2004)
(noting that the Court granted certiorari in view of the "division among the Circuits").
91. See id. ("[D]oes § 1782(a) make discovery available to complainants, such as
AMD, who do not have the status of private 'litigants' and are not sovereign agents?").
92. Idat256.
93. Id. at 257.
94. Id.
95. Id
96. Id. at 253.
97. See id at 258 ("Intel also urges that AMvD's complaint has not progressed beyond
the investigative stage; therefore, no adjudicative action is currently or even imminently on
the Commission's agenda.").
98. Id. at 259.
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proceeding be 'pending. "'9 9 Thus, the Court concluded, it is not necessary
for the adjudicative proceeding to be pending at the time the evidence is
sought, but only that the evidence is eventually to be used in such a
proceeding. 00
Also, the Court was asked to determine whether § 1782(a) contains a
foreign-discoverability requirement 'o'-in other words, whether the
evidence sought under §1782(a) must be of a sort that would be
discoverable if it were located in the foreign jurisdiction.10 2 Intel advanced
two policy reasons in support of a foreign-discoverability limitation on
§ 1782(a): International comity and parity.103 Intel argued, on international
comity grounds, that foreign governments will find American-style
discovery offensive.104 The Court, citing again Hans Smit's article, rejected
this argument and noted "[tlhere is no reason to assume that because a
country has not adopted a particular discovery procedure, it would take
05
offense at its use."'1
Additionally, Intel argued that if the Court granted § 1782 discovery,
then parity would be destroyed among the adversaries.106 The Court, again
citing Hans Smit's article, also rejected this argument and noted that
"[w]hen information is sought by an 'interested person,' a district court
could condition relief upon that person's reciprocal exchange of
information."107 Furhermore, the Court concluded, "[c]oncerns about
maintaining parity among adversaries in litigation likewise do not provide a
08
sound basis for a cross-the-board foreign-discoverability rule."1

99. Id. at 258.
100. Id. at 259.
101. See id. at 253 (noting the "division among the Circuits on the question whether
§ 1782(a) contains a foreign-discoverability requirement").
102. See id. at 259-60 ("Does § 1782(a) categorically bar a district court from ordering
production of documents when the foreign tribunal or the 'interested person' would not be
able to obtain the documents if they were located in the foreign jurisdiction?").
103. See id. at 261 (noting Intel's position that "Congress did not seek to place itself on
a collision course with foreign tribunals and legislatures, which have carefully chosen the
procedures and laws best suited to their concepts of litigation" (citations omitted)).
104. See id. ("Intel raises two policy concerns in support of a foreign-discoverability
limitation on § 1782(a) aid-avoiding offense to foreign governments, and maintaining parity
between litigants.").
105. Id
106. See id at 262 (noting that Intel's second policy argument is predicated on parity
concerns).
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. Id.
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Therefore, the Court held that "[w]hile comity and parity concerns may be
important as touchstones for a district court's exercise of discretion in
particular cases, they do not permit our insertion of a generally applicable
foreign-discoverability rule into the text of § 1782(a)." 09
Finally, the Court provided a discretionary guidance test to be used by
district courts when exercising their discretion in deciding § 1782 petitions
by enumerating several factors that they should consider."10 These factors
provide the analytical framework for the second prong of the
comprehensive framework proposed by this Note in Part VIII."11 It is
important to note that the Court cited Hans Smit's article and the 1964
Senate Report to support these factors." 2 Parts V and VIII argue that the
Intel Court, Hans Smit, and the legislative history all stand for the
proposition that policy considerations should be used only when the district
court is exercising its discretion and not when considering what constitutes

a tribunal.'"

3

The first factor courts should consider is whether discovery is being
sought from a party to the proceedings." 4 The need for judicial assistance
is "not as apparent" where discovery is sought from a party to the foreign
proceeding, since the tribunal itself can order parties to produce evidence.' '"
Discovery sought from nonparties, however, may only be obtainable
pursuant to § 1782 because the nonparty is out of the jurisdiction of the
foreign tribunal." 6 Second, the district court may take into account the
nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings underway
109. Id at 261 (emphasis added).
1 10. See id at 264 ('As earlier emphasized, a district court is not required to grant a
§ 1782(a) discovery application simply because it has the authority to do so." (citations
omnitted)).
I111. See infra Part VilI (proposing a comprehensive solution that will provide a sound
judicial analytical framework when dealing with § 1782 petitions).
112. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264 (2004)
(relying on Professor Hans Smit's law review article to guide the Court's analysis).
113. See infra Part VilI (arguing policy should be considered under prong two of the
proposed solution).
114. See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 264 ("First, when the person from whom discovery is
sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding (as Intel is here), the need for § 1782(a) aid
generally is not as apparent as it ordinarily is when evidence is sought from a nonparticipant
in the matter arising abroad.").
115. See id ("A foreign tribunal has jurisdiction over those appearing before it, and can
itself order them to produce evidence.").
116. See id. ("[Nionparticipants in the foreign proceeding may be outside the foreign
tribunal's jurisdictional reach; hence, their evidence, available in the United States, may be
unobtainable absent § 1782(a) aid.").

IF IT LOOKS LIKE A DUCK

17
1675

abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign government or the court or agency
abroad to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance.' 17 For example, a court
could consider whether the § 1782 petition constitutes an attempt to make
an end-run around "foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of
a foreign country or the United States.""' Third, the district court should
consider whether the request is "unduly intrusive or burdensome," and
whether such request should be narrowed. 1 9
While the Court was not asked to decide whether a private arbitration
tribunal constitutes a "tribunal" under the statute, its decision sheds light on
that issue.'120 The Court had to determine whether AMD's application for
§ 1782 discovery was "for use in a foreign or international tribunal."'12 ' The
Court noted that "when Congress established the Commission on
International Rules of Judicial Procedure in 1958," it instructed the Rules
Commission to "recommend procedural revisions 'for the rendering of
assistance to foreign courts and quasi-judicial agencies."'12 2 Before the
1964 amendments, § 1782 had previously referred to "any judicial
The Rules Commission's draft, which Congress
proceeding."12 3
in 1964, replaced the term "any judicial proceeding'
adopted
subsequently
with "a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal."12 4 The Court
concluded that "Congress understood that change to 'provide the possibility
of U.S. judicial assistance in connection with administrative and quasijudicial proceedings abroad."" 25 In other words, "Congress introduced the
word 'tribunal' to ensure that 'assistance is not confined to proceedings
before conventional courts,' but extends also to 'administrative and quasi26
judicial proceedings.""1

Furthermore, the Court emphasized Congress's intent to expand the
applicable scope of § 1782 and favorably quoted Hans Smit's definition of
117. Id.
118. Id.at 265.
119. See id. ("Also, unduly intrusive or burdensome requests may be rejected or
trimmed.").
120. See id. at 258 (providing a detailed discussion of the legislative history of § 1782,
and using Hans Smit's article to structure the Court's analysis).
121. See id. at 246 ("This case concerns the authority of federal district courts to assist
in the production of evidence for use in a foreign or international tribunal.").
122. Id. at 257-58 (emphasis in original).
123. Id.at 2 58.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 249.
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"[T]he term 'tribunal' . . . includes
the statutory term tribunal.127
investigating magistrates, administrative and arbitral tribunals, and quasijudicial agencies, as well as conventional civil, commercial, criminal, and
administrative courts." 22' After adopting Hans Smit's definition, the Court
determined that it "hald] no warrant to exclude the [DG-Competition], to
the extent it acts as a first-instance decisionmaker, from § 1782(a)'s
ambit." 129 Moreover, the DG-Competition would conduct proceedings
which lead to a dispositive ruling. 130 Thus, the DG-Competition is a
tribunal under the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 1782.'131
IV Post-Intel: The Split Occurs in Navigating § 1782
Despite Intel, the question of whether international arbitral tribunals
constitute "foreign tribunals" has continued to generate conflict among the
district courts.132 Some district courts have held that NBC and Biedermann
remain good law, unaffected by the Supreme Court's dicta.'13 Conversely,
other district courts have ordered discovery in private international
commercial arbitration proceedings citing Intel as auhriy
Currently,
no Federal Court of Appeals has ruled on this issue since Intel.'13' This Part
127. See id. at 258 (noting the expansiveness of the statutory scope of § 1782, which
includes arbitral bodies).
128. Id
129. Id.
130. See id. at 255 ("The statute authorizes, but does not require, a federal district court
to provide assistance to a complainant in a European Commission proceeding that leads to a
dispositive ruling....1)
131. See id. at 258 ("[I]n addition to affording assistance in cases before the European
Court of Justice, § 1782, as revised in 1964, 'permits the rendition of proper aid in
proceedings before the European Commission in which the Commission exercises quasijudicial powers."').
132. Compare In reApplication of Roz Trading Ltd., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1227 (N.D.
Ga. 2006) (holding that a private arbitral panel of the International Arbitral Centre of the
Austrian Federal Economic Chamber was a § 1782 tribunal), with In re Application of Oxus
Gold PLC, No. MISC 06-82, 2006 WL 2927615, at *6 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2006) (noting that
international arbitral panels created exclusively by private parties are not included in Section
1782(a)'s meaning).
133. See Coniisi6n Ejecutiva, Hidroeldctrica del Rio Lempa v. El Paso Corp., 617 F.
Supp. 2d 481, 485 (S.D. Tex, 2008) (noting that Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int'l
is still good law and that the court is bound to follow).
134. See, e.g., In re Application of Hallmark Capital Corp., 534 F. Supp. 2d 951, 957
(D. Minn. 2007) (holding that a private Israeli arbitral body was a § 1782 tribunal).
135. The Seventh Circuit is currently reviewing the district court's decision in Norfolk
Southern Corp. v. Ace Bermuda Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 2d 882, 885 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
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is a review of the relevant post-Intel cases that attempt to navigate the
application of § 1782 to international arbitration.
A. District Court Decisions: A PrivateInternationalArbitral Body Is Not
a § 1782 Tribunal

In In re Application of Oxus Gold PLC, 3 6 the District Court for the
District of New Jersey noted that "international arbitral panels created
exclusively by private parties. ... are not included in the statute's
meaning."13 7 In Oxus Gold, the dispute involved a joint venture between a
subsidiary of Oxus Gold PLC (Oxus) and a company owned by the Kyrgyz
government that was created in order to develop and exploit a gold deposit
in the Kyrgyz Republic. 13 8 Oxus initiated arbitration against the Kyrgyz
Republic under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) pursuant to the United KingdomKyrgyz Bilateral Investment Treaty (the BIT) claiming that the government
violated the BIT. 139 Oxus applied to the District Court for the District of
New Jersey for an order compelling a corporate finance company, SIG
Overseas Ltd., and its managing director, to provide discovery in aid of
40

arbitration.1

The district court granted Oxus's discovery request.'14 ' In examining
whether or not private arbitration tribunals are within the scope of § 1782,
the court relied primarily on the Second Circuit's NBC decision.' 42 Though
the Oxus court referred to Intel, it did so only to evaluate the "interested
person" requirement for § 1782.14 Therefore, the court never analyzed
Intel in the context of what constitutes an "international tribunal."'"4
136. See In reApplication of Oxus Gold PLC, No. MISC 06-82, 2006 WL 2927615, at
*6 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2006) (holding that the international proceeding in the present case is
included as a foreign or international tribunal and noting that a reasoned distinction can be
made between arbitrations such as those conducted by UNCITRAL, and purely private
arbitrations established by private contract).
137. Id
138. See id at * 1 (discussing the factual background).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.at *10.
142. See id. at *6 (noting the Second Circuit's NBC opinion directly held that private
arbitral tribunals are beyond the scope of § 1782).
143. Id.
144. See id. (applying the Second Circuit's NBC analytical framework to the issue of
whether or not a private arbitral tribunal is within the scope of § 1782).
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Instead, the court concluded that NBC is still good law.'145 The court noted,
however, that "[t]he arbitration is not the result of a contract or agreement
between private parties as in National Broadcasting. The proceedings in
issue have been authorized by the sovereign states of the United Kingdom
and the Kyrgyzstan Republic for the purpose of adjudicating disputes under
the Bilateral Investment Treaty. 1 46 Thus, "a reasoned distinction can be
made between arbitrations such as those conducted by UNCITRAL, a body
operating under the United Nations and established by its member states,
147
and purely private arbitrations established by private contract."
Accordingly, the court held that the international proceeding in the present
148
case is included as a "foreign or international tribunal."
Similarly, in Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Ace Bermuda Ltd.,14 the
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that private arbitral
tribunals "do[] not fall within the definition the Supreme Court embraced in
its Intel dictum."1 5 0 In this case, there was an ongoing arbitration dispute in
London between Norfolk Southern Corporation (Norfolk) and Ace
Bermuda LTD. (Ace).1 5 ' The underlying dispute involved insurance
coverage for losses incurred in connection with a train derailment in South
Carolina. 1 12 Norfolk filed a motion under § 1782, asking the court to order
53
the deposition of Ace's former counsel.1
The district court denied Norfolk's discovery request. 514 The court
cited approvingly NBC and Biedermann, and interpreted "the Intel Court's
reference to 'arbitral tribunals' as including state-sponsored arbitral bodies
but excluding purely private arbitrations." 155 Furthermore, the court looked
145. Id.
146. Id. (citations omitted).
147. Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Ace Bermuda Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 2d 882, 885 (N.D. Il1.
2009).
148. In re Application of Oxus Gold PLC, No. MISC 06-82, 2006 WL 2927615. at *6
(D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2006).
149. See Norfolk Southern Corp., 626 F. Supp. 2d at 886 (holding that private arbitral
tribunals do not fall within the definition the Supreme Court embraced in its Intel dictum).
150. Id
151. See id at 882 (discussing the factual background).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See id at 886 ("I generally agree with the conclusion of the Second and Fifth
Circuits that the legislative history of § 1782 does not support the inclusion of private
arbitral tribunals within the scope of § 1782(a), I am without authority to order the relief
movants seek. Accordingly, their motion is denied.").
155. Id.at 885.
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at the legislative history and concluded that "although the Intel Court
acknowledged the ways in which Congress has progressively broadened the
scope of § 1782, it stopped short of declaring that any foreign body
56
exercising adjudicatory power falls within the purview of the statute."1
Moreover, "the ellipses in the Court's citation to Smit ... suggest that the
1 7
Court was not willing to embrace the full breadth of Smit's definition.
Thus, the court held private arbitral bodies are outside the scope of

§ 1782.158
Additionally, in Comisi6n Ejecutiva, Hidroelgctricadel Rio Lempa v.
El Paso Corp. 159 the District Court for the Southern District of Texas
concluded "[t]he Supreme Court in Intel shed no light on the issue" of
whether § 1782(a) discovery was available to parties to private foreign
arbitrations, and held "under the controlling precedent of Biedermann Int'l,
the Court has no power to grant CEL's application for discovery." 6 0 This
case involved an ongoing arbitration between Nejapa Power Company,
L.L.C. and Comisi6n Ejecutiva, Hidroelkctrica del Rio Lempa (CEL) in
Geneva, Switzerland. 16 1 CEL filed an application with the court requesting
discovery from El Paso Corporation (El Paso), a third-party. 6 The court
El Paso filed a motion for
initially granted the discovery order. 66'
reconsideration arguing that the court lacked authority to consider CEL's
application because § 1782 is unavailable to litigants in a private
international arirtin 6
The court agreed with El Paso and denied CEL's discovery request.16
The court determined that "the Supreme Court has not addressed the
15 6.
15 7.

Id
Id

158. See id at 886 (noting that Professor Hans Smit's statutory definition of § 1782 is
that "the term 'tribunal' embraces all bodies exercising adjudicatory powers, and includes
investigating magistrates, administrative and arbitral tribunals, and quasi-judicial agencies,
as well as conventional civil, commercial, criminal, and administrative courts" (emphasis in
original)).
159. See Comisi6n Ejecutiva, Hidroel~ctrica del Rio Lempa v. El Paso Corp., 617 F.
Supp. 2d 481, 487 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (holding that Intel shed no light on the issue of whether
§ 1782(a) discovery was available to parties to private foreign arbitrations and under the
controlling precedent of Biedertnann Int'l, the Court has no power to grant § 1782
discovery).
160. Id. at 485.
161. See id at 482 (discussing the factual background).
162. Id
163. Id
164. Id
165. Idat487.

1680

68067
WASH. & LEE L..REV 1659 (2010)

application of § 1782 to arbitral tribunals, not even in dicta."06 6 Moreover,
"Intel never mentions arbitral tribunals in the text of the opinion itself..
Consequent with Intel's line of direction, it comes as no surprise that
arbitral tribunals make not so much as a cameo appearance, but more that of
an 'extra' in Intel's consideration of the scope of § 1782 tribunals."167 Also,
the court noted that the legislative history and the Court's use of Professor
Hans Smit's article stands only for the proposition that § 1782 applies to
quasi-judicial agencies and administrative courts. 168 Furthermore, the court
noted, Intel does not endorse Professor Smit' s expansive view to include
private arbitral tribunals within the scope of § 1782 .169 Therefore, the court
70
concluded it was bound by the Fifth Circuit's holding in Biedermann.1
B. DistrictCourt Decisions: A PrivateInternationalArbitralBody Is a
§ 1782 Tribunal
In contrast, a number of district courts have relied upon the Intel
decision to support their conclusions that private international arbitral
bodies qualify as "tribunals" for purposes of § 1782. In In re Application
of Roz Trading Ltd. ,' the District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia, applying the Intel analysis, held that the International Arbitral
Centre of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber (Centre) constituted a
In this case, there was an
"tribunal" within the meaning of § 1782.7
ongoing arbitration between Roz Trading and Coca-Cola Export Company,
a Coca-Cola subsidiary. 173 The dispute involved a joint venture agreement
entered into by Roz Trading, the government of Uzbekistan, and the CocaCola subsidiary.174 Roz Trading sought documents from the Coca-Cola
166. Id at 485 (emphasis in original).
167. Id.
168. Idat486.
169. See id. ("Smit does not speak for the Supreme Court. Until, and, if, the Supreme
Court itself adopts Hans Smrit's statements as its own within the text of the opinion itself,
Hans Smit's opinions on arbitral tribunals has no more weight and authority than any other
article.").
170. Id.
171. See In re Application of Roz Trading Ltd., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1228 (N.D. Ga.
2006) (holding that when applying Intel's analysis, private international arbitral bodies
constitute a tribunal within the statutory construction of § 1782).
172. Id.
173. See id. at 1223 (discussing the factual background).
174. Id
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Company for use in the arbitration. 7 5 Objecting to the discovery request,
Coca-Cola argued that the Centre is not a "tribunal" for purposes of § 1782
because "the Centre is a private institution whose proceedings are voluntary
76
and arbitral."'1
The district court rejected Coca-Cola's argument and granted the
discovery request.177 The court interpreted the Intel decision as providing
"sufficient guidance .. . to determine that arbitral panels ...are 'tribunals'
within the statute's scope."' 78 Furthermore, "[js]tatutory construction of
Also, the court rejected
§ 1782(a) confirms this conclusion."179
Biedermann and NBC as good law because "[t]he reasoning in Intel
demonstrates the structural and analytical flaws in the Second and Fifth
Circuits' interpretations of § 1782(a)."' 8 0 Moreover, "[t]he Supreme
Court's interpretation and application of the legislative history contradicts
the interpretations and applications of the Second and Fifth Circuits, which
incorrectly concluded that Congress intended to limit the availability of
judicial assistance under § 1782 to governmental-that is criminal, civil, or
admnisratve-rocedigs.181 Instead, "Congress expressly struck the
phrase 'judicial proceeding,' and replaced it with 'international or foreign
tribunal.' The clear import of the change is to broaden the scope of the
statute to include non-judicial proceedings." 8 12 Thus, private arbitral
tribunals are within the scope of § 1782. 183
Similarly, in In re Application of Babcock Borsig AG, 184 the District
Court for the District of Massachusetts, following Intel's analytical
framework, held that the International Chamber of Commerce International
Court of Arbitration (ICC) is a "tribunal" within the meaning of § 1782(a).
In this case, Babcock Borsig AG (BBAG), a German corporation, moved to
compel Babcock Power Inc. (BPI), a corporation headquartered in
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1224.
177. See id. at 1224-25 ("A finding that an arbitral panel of the Centre is a 'tribunal'
within the meaning of § 1782(a) is consistent with the reasoning in Intel.").
178. Idat 1224
179. Id. at 1225.
180. Id. at 1226.
181. Id at 1227.
182. Id. at 1226 (quoting 23 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2006)).
183. See id at 1228 (concluding Intel only stands for the proposition that private
international arbitral bodies constitute a tribunal under § 1782).
184. See In re Application of Babcock Borsig AG, 583 F. Supp. 2d 233, 240 (D. Mass.
2008) ("For these reasons, I conclude that the ICC is a 'tribunal' within the meaning of
§ 1782(a), and that all of the required elements of the statute have been met.").
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Massachusetts, to produce documents and give testimony pursuant to
§ 1782(a) for use in a potential arbitration between BBAG and Babcock-

Hitachi K.K. (Hitachi), a Japanese corporation, in the

ICC.'

The dispute

involved an arbitration provision in a contract between BBAG and Hitachi
for the sale of BBAG's business assets. 186 BPI and Hitachi both objected to
BBAG's § 1782 motion, claiming that § 1782(a) does not authorize
discovery orders for proceedings before private arbitral bodies such as the

ICC.187

The district court rejected this argument.188 The court interpreted Intel
as providing "meaningful insight regarding the Supreme Court's view of
arbitral bodies in the context of § 1782(a)." 189 The court noted that
although "Intel did not directly address whether private arbitral bodies like
the ICC qualify as 'tribunals' under § 1782(a), the Court's reasoning and
dicta strongly indicate that these types of adjudicative bodies also fall
within the statute."' 9" Moreover, Hans Smit, the "dominant drafter of, and
commentator on, the 1964 revision of... § 1782," concluded that private
arbitral bodies are included within the statutory term "tribunal. "'1
Furthermore, private arbitral bodies are "first-instance decisionmaker[s]"
that conduct proceedings which lead to a dispositive ruling.'192 In other
words, "if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck,
then it's a duck."093 Thus, the court concluded, the ICC is a tribunal under

§ 1782.94~

185. See id. at 235 (discussing the factual background).
186. Id
187. See id. at 239 ("Hitachi and BPI rely primarily on pre-Intel cases that concluded
that private arbitral bodies were not 'tribunals' under § 1782(a).").
188. See id. ("I do not find the reasoning in National BroadcastingCo. and Republic of
Kazakhstan to be persuasive, particularly in light of the subsequent Supreme Court decision
in Intel.").
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Idn.4.
192. See id. at 238 ("The ICC, like the European Commission, is a 'first-instance
decisionmaker' that conducts proceedings which lead to a dispositive ruling.").
193. See Lake v. Neal, 585 F.3d 1059, 1059 (7th Cir. 2009) ("The Duck Test holds that
if it walks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it's a duck." (emphasis in
original)).
194. See In re Application of Babcock Borsig AG, 583 F. Supp. 2d 233, 240 (D. Mass.
2008) ("1 conclude that the ICC is a 'tribunal' within the meaning of § 1782(a), and that all
of the required elements of the statute have been met.").
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Also, the court provided a useful example on how to apply Intel's
discretionary test. After reaching the conclusion that the ICC is a tribunal,
the court applied Intel's discretionary test to determine whether or not to
grant § 1782.19 The court noted that § 1782 does not require a district
court "to grant a § 1782(a) discovery application simply because it has the
authority to do So.,,196 In exercising discretion, the court argued, it should
do so with great care and restraint.19 7 Moreover, "if there is reliable
evidence that the foreign tribunal would not make any use of the requested
material, it may be irresponsible for a district court to order discovery,
98
especially where it involves substantial costs to the parties involved."1
The court concluded BBAG' s § 1782 petition would be unduly intrusive,
burdensome, and costly. 199 Also, the court was concerned that BBAG's
petition might constitute an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering
201
200
restnictions.'0 Accordingly, the court denied BBAG's discovery request.
Additionally, in In re Application of Hallmark Capital Corp. ,202 the
District Court for the District of Minnesota, following Intel's analytical
framework, held that an Israeli arbitral body is an adjudicatory tribunal
under § 1782.20 This case involved ongoing arbitration between Hallmark
and UltraShape, Inc. (UltraShape) .2 0' Hallmark filed an application with
the court requesting discovery from Michael Berman (Berman), chairman
195. See id. ("The Supreme Court in Intel identified two general factors that district
courts should consider when determining whether an application brought under § 1782(a)
should be granted . ..
196. Id
197. See id. at 242 ("The apparent bad blood among these parties, coupled with the fact
that BBAG has not taken any formal steps toward initiating arbitration in the ICC after
allegedly discovering Hitachi's misconduct almost two years ago, are grounds for exercising
restraint before ordering discovery in this setting.").
198. Id. at24 1.
199. See id. ("In the present case, however, neither party has presented 'authoritative
proof regarding the receptivity of the ICC to the discovery materials requested.").
200. See id at 242 (noting that "Hitachi and BPI have accused BBAG of using this
to circumvent the evidentiary restrictions of the ICC. ...or effectively
discovery request. ...
to open a new front to obtain materials from BPI they were unable to obtain in the prior
litigation").
201. See id ("For now. ...I exercise this court's discretion under § 1782(a) to deny
BBAG's motion to compel without prejudice.").
202. See In re Application of Hallmark Capital Corp., 534 F. Supp. 2d 951, 957 (D.
Minn. 2007) ("[T~his Court concludes that the assistance permissible under Section 1782
may extend to private arbitration bodies such as that at issue here.").
203. See id. (holding that a private Israeli body is a tribunal because of the general
analytical framework provided by the Supreme Court in Intel).
204. See id at 953 (discussing the factual background).
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of UltraShape and a nonparty to the arbitration proceeding. 2 05 The court
initially granted the discovery order.20
Berman filed a motion for
reconsideration arguing that the court lacked authority to consider
Hallmark's application for discovery because § 1782 is unavailable to
litigants in a private international arbitration. 0
The court disagreed with Berman and granted Hallmark's discovery
request. 208 The court determined that "[a]lthough the Supreme Court did
not squarely hold that foreign private arbitration bodies qualifyr as a
'tribunal' under Section 1782," the Court's "general approach to Section
1782, as well as that statute's legislative history, makes clear that the statute
is best read not to impose any restrictive definitional exclusions that would
09
necessarily preclude assistance to all private arbitral bodies.i 2
Furthermore, the court noted, "both the 'common usage' and 'widely
accepted definition' of 'tribunal' include arbitral bodies. 0 So, had
"Congress wanted to impose the limitation advanced by the party opposing
extension of Section 1782 to private arbitration bodies, it would have been
a simple matter to add the word 'governmental' before the word 'tribunal'
in the 1964 amendment.",2'1 'Therefore, it is implausible to add a restrictive

definitional interpretation to "tribunal.1 212

Also, the court noted, "the [Supreme] Court cited Prof. Smit's 1965
article no less than six times, all apparently with approval. 1 Since the
1964 amendments, Hans Smit has continued to reiterate that "the new
legislation also authorizes assistance in aid of international arbitral
tribunals. 2 14 Moreover, "Mr. Smit's 1965 article appears to be the
definitive work on the evolution of Section 1782 that culminated in the
1964 amendments, which broadened the scope of the statute from 'judicial
proceedings' to 'a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal."' i2 15
205. Id
206. Id.
207. See id. ("Mr. Berman now contends that Section 1782 does not authorize judicial
assistance for proceedings before private arbitration panels. .. .)
208. See id at 958 (rejecting the motion for reconsideration).
209. Idat955.
210. Idat 954.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 955 (noting if Congress wanted a restrictive statute it could have
qualified § 1782 to reflect their will).
213. Id.
214. Id
2 15. Id

IF IT LOOKS LIKE A DUCK

1685
18

Thus, the court concluded that the only plausible reading of the legislative
history and Hans Smit's article is that § 1782 includes private international
arbitral bodies. 1 Accordingly, the court held the Israeli arbitral body is a
tribunal. 1
V Hans Smit: "The Dominant Drafter"of § 1782
Circuit Judge Ginsburg, now Justice Ginsburg, described Hans Smit as
"the dominant drafter of, and commentator on, the 1964 revision" to
§ 1782.21 Justice Ginsburg's description provides two important points
that this Note adopts. First, Hans Smit is "the dominant drafter of'
§ 1782 .21 9 This point underscores Hans Smit's legislative influence. Smnit
played a dominant role in drafting the phrase "a proceeding in a foreign or

international tribunal," which is the textual source of the current

split.22 0

Second, Smit is "the dominant ... commentator on" § 1782 .221 This point
underscores Hans Smit's scholarship influence. So, if there is confusion
over what constitutes a "foreign or international tribunal," then courts
should look to his subsequent scholarship. 2 Thus, Smit's interpretation of
what constitutes a "tribunal" is of particular importance.

216. See id. at 956 ("[Olbjections to extending the reach of Section 1782 to private
arbitrations are at least implicitly countered by the Court's ruling in Intel.").
217. See id at 957 (concluding private arbitral adjudicatory bodies constitute a tribunal
under § 1782).
218. In re Letter of Request from Crown Prosecution Service of United Kingdom, 870
F.2d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
219. Id.
220. Compare Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Ace Bermuda Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 2d 882, 886
(N.D. 1ll. 2009) (holding that private arbitral tribunals do not fall within the definition the
Supreme Court embraced in its Intel dictum), with In re Application of Roz Trading Ltd.,
469 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1228 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (holding that when applying Intel's analysis
private international arbitral bodies constitute a tribunal within the statutory construction of
§ 1782).
221. In re Letter of Request from Crown Prosecution Service of United Kingdom, 870
F.2d at 689.
222. See Smit, supra note 17, at 155 ("[W]hether a particular aspect was addressed
more specifically in the explanatory notes or in a law review article was essentially a matter
of my choice.").
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A. Legislative Influence

One scholar noted that § 1782 "is the product of a comprehensive
reiinof U.S. legislation governing international judicial assistance."2
The revision process began in 1958, when Congress created the
Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure (International
Rules Commission) in order to address deficiencies in international
cooperation in obtaining evidence, serving documents, and proving
documents. 2 At that time, many international scholars believed that the
"United States courts neither receive adequate assistance from, nor dispense
adequate aid to other nations. 22 5 Additionally, scholars noted, the United
States "permit[ted] such widespread confuision and such profound disregard
for the concept of comity or international obligation in connection with
judicial assistance between nations. 226 All of these concerns were to be
addressed by the International Rules Commission. 2
To assist the International Rules Commission, Columbia Law School
established a Project on International Procedure. 228 Hans Smit noted that
"[s]ince Congress had allocated no funds to the Advisory Committee and
the [International Rules] Commission, the Columbia Law School
Proj ect ... was requested by the Commission to develop and draft
legislative measures relating to judicial assistance in international
litigation. 229 Professor Smit was the Columbia Project's director and
served as Reporter to the International Rules Commission .2 30 Also, Ruth
223. See Daniel J. Rothstein, A Proposalto Clarf US. Law on Judicial Assistance in
Taking Evidence for InternationalArbitration, 19 Am. REV'. INT'L ARB. 61, 68 (2008) (noting
the legislative history of § 1782).
224. See id. (providing the historical context of the 1964 Amendments to § 1782).
225. Harry L. Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a
Program for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515, 516 (1953). When the International Rules
Commission was created, Jones became its director.
226. Id. at 538.
227. See Rothstein, supra note 223, at 68 (noting that Congress was concerned with the
growth of international commerce).
228. See Smit, supra note 17, at 154 ("Since Congress had allocated no funds to the
Advisory Committee and the Commission, the Columbia Law School Project on
International Procedure, of which I was the Director, was requested by the Commission to
develop and draft legislative measures relating to judicial assistance in international
litigation.").
229. Id.
230. See Rothstein, supra note 223, at 68-69 ("Columbia Law School established a
Project on International Procedure to assist the International Rules Commission. Professor
Smit was the Columbia Project's director and served as Reporter to the Commission.").
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Bader Ginsburg, who later wrote the Supreme Court's Intel decision,

worked closely with Smit as an associate director of the

Project.2

Hans

Smit's role was to select the specific subjects that were to be addressed by
legislation, analyze the deficiencies of existing law, and draft proposals to
eliminate those deficiencies .2 12 Embracing his role, Smit drafted several
legislative proposals and provided explanatory notes to the various
Congress adopted, wholesale and
legislative provisions proposed. 3
without change, Smit's legislative proposals. 3 In sum, Smit's legislative
proposals are the 1964 amendments to § 1782.23
One of the most notable amendments was that federal district courts
could order the production of documents or testimony "for use in a
proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal. 23 6 "This quoted language
replaced judicial proceedings pending in any court in a foreign country with
which the United States is at peace. 2 37 The legislative intent of the phrase
"international tribunal" and the purposes behind the 1964 amendments,
Smit noted, is clear: "[T]he word 'tribunal,' clearly encompass[es] private
arbitral tribunals ... [and] the choice of that term was deliberate so as to
depart from the text used in the legislation that was amended ... and that
the purpose of Section 1782 was to make assistance available on the most

liberal termas.",238

Furthermore, Smit determined, it is against public policy when district
courts fail to recognize international private arbitral bodies as a tribunal. 3
As Smit noted, "[d]iscrimmiating against private international tribunals not
only does violence to the plain and clear text of Section 1782, it also fails to
give consequence to the repeatedly re-affirmed public policy favoring

231. See id at 69 ("Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who later wrote the Supreme Court's Intel
decision, was an associate director of the Project.").
232. Smit, supra note 17, at 154.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 155.
236. See Conley, supra note 9, at 47 (providing the historical and political
developments leading up to the 1964 Amendments to § 1782) (emphasis in original).
237. Id; see also Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 247
(2004) (providing the historical and political context of the 1964 Amendments to § 1782).
238. Smit, supra note 17, at 154.
239. See id at 160 ("The [Second Circuit's NBC] opinion grants this assistance to
public foreign and international tribunals, but denies it to private arbitral trbunals .... The
policy that favors arbitration is ill served by a construction of Section 1782 that singles out
private international and foreign arbitral tribunals for discriminatory treatment.").
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arbitration. 24 0 Thus, "[tjbere simply is no good reason for withholding
from private international tribunals who have been accorded by the body
politic the power to adjudicate controversies and in fact to do so largely in a
single instance, the assistance that they may need to obtain requisite

information.

41

B. Scholarship Influence
Hans Smit has written extensively on the nature and scope of
§ 1782.24 Notably, a year after his work on the 1964 congressional
amendments, he wrote an article which was published in the 1965 edition of
the Columbia Law Review. 24 1 In his article, Smit discussed the effect of the
1964 amendments to § 1782 .244 Smit noted that the "substitution of the
word 'tribunal' for 'court' was deliberate, for the drafters wanted to make
the assistance provided for available to all bodies with adjudicatory
functions. 4 Additionally, Smit provided examples of what constitutes a
tribunal: "The term 'tribunal' embraces all bodies exercising adjudicatory
powers, and includes investigating magistrates, administrative and arbitral
tribunals, and quasi-judicial agencies, as well as conventional civil,
commercial, criminal, and administrative courts. 2 46 Justice Ginsburg's
majority opinion in Intel quoted this language favorably when it determined
that the DG-Competition constituted a tribunal under § 1782.24
Furthermore, when Justice Ginsburg reviewed the legislative history of
§ 1782 in Intel, she treated both the Congressional reports and Smit's article

240. Id at 155.
241. Id.at 156.
242. See, e.g., Hans Smit, Recent Developments in InternationalLitigation, 35 S. TEX.
L. Rnv. 215, 217 (1994) (discussing the composition of the International Rules Commission
created by Congress, his role as the Reporter, and the changes to § 1782).
243. See Smit, supra note 35, at 1015 (discussing the political and historical events
leading up to the 1964 Amendments and noting the purposes behind those amendments).
244. Id
245. Hans Smit, American Assistance to Litigation in Foreign and International

Tribunals: Section 1782 of Title 28 of the U.S. C. Revisited, 25

SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM.

1,5(1998).
246. Id at 1026 n.71 (emphasis added).

247.

See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258

(2004) ("The

term 'trbunal' . .. includes investigating magistrates, administrative and arbitral tribunals,
and quasi-judicial agencies, as well as conventional civil, commercial, criminal, and
administrative courts.").
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as equal authority. 4 As already noted, Justice Ginsburg not only worked
with Smit in drafting the 1964 amendments, but also recognized Smrit as the
"dominant drafter" of those amendments .249 Ginsburg's sentiment and
affection for Smit's scholarship is on display throughout the Intel
opinion. 5 Intel was the Court's first opportunity to interpret § 1782.25
And, the big winner of that case was Hans Smit's scholarship. Smit's
scholarship was cited or quoted fourteen times to support the Court's
holdings. 5 For example, the Court cited Smit when it held that "§ 1782(a)
requires only that a dispositive ruling. ... be within reasonable
contemplation," and when the Court provided the discretionary guidance

test.25

3

Even more telling is that Smit's scholarship has never been
discredited. 5 The district courts that have concluded that private arbitral
bodies are outside the scope of § 1782 have never discredited Smit's
scholarship. 25 5 At most, courts argue that Smit does not speak for the
But, the Cour' s opinion in Intel seems to suggest that Smit
legislature2.
does not speak for the legislature, but as the legislator. 5

248. See id. at 248 (citing both the legislative history and Smit's article when "Congress
unanimously adopted legislation recommended by the Rules Commission").
249. See In re Letter of Request from Crown Prosecution Serv. of United Kingdom,
870 F.2d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (describing Hans Smit as "the dominant drafter of, and
commnentator on, the 1964 revision" to § 1782).
250. See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 258 (citing Smit's article to define the statutory term
"tribunal").
251. See id. at 253 (noting that the Court is asked to resolve several questions involving
§ 1782).
252. See generally id
253. Id at 259.
254. See, e.g., id. at 247-66 (citing no contradicting authority when relying on Smit's
scholarship).
255. See Norfolk S. Corp. v. Ace Bermuda Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 2d 882, 885 (N.D. Ill.
2009) (noting that the Supreme Court stopped short of declaring any foreign body exercising
adjudicatory powers falls within the purview of § 1782 and thus did not fully embrace Hans
Smit's interpretation).
256. See Comisi6n Ejecutiva, Hidroeldctrica del Rio Lempa v. El Paso Corp., 617 F.
Supp. 2d 481, 487 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (concluding that Hans Smit does not speak for the
legislature).
257. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258 (2004) (citing
Hans Smit's scholarship and the Senate Report interchangeably).
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VT The Legislative History of the 1964 Amendments to § 1 782: The
Wholesale Adoption of Hans Smit 's Work by Congress
Congress adopted, wholesale and without any change, the legislative
Smit.258
1782 .259 The

proposals and explanatory notes drafted by Hans

Smit's legislative

proposals are the 1964 amendments to §
1964 amendments
replaced the phrase "any judicial proceeding" with "a proceeding in a

foreign or international tribunal.

26 0

A. The 1964 Amendments in Context
The Supreme Court, in Intel, provided the political and historical
context leading up to the 1964 Amendments. The Court noted:
Section 1782 is the product of congressional efforts, over the span of
nearly 150 years, to provide federal-court assistance in gathering
evidence for use in foreign tribunals. Congress first provided for
federal-court aid to foreign tribunals in 1855; requests for aid took the
form of letters rogatory forwarded through diplomatic channels. In
1948, Congress substantially broadened the scope of assistance federal
courts could provide for foreign proceedings. That legislation, codified
as § 1782, eliminated the prior requirement that the government of a
foreign country be a party or have an interest in the proceeding. The
measure allowed district courts to designate persons to preside at
depositions "to be used in any civil action pending in any court in a
foreign country with which the United States is at peace." The next
year, Congress deleted "civil action" from § 1782's text and inserted
"judicial proceeding." In 1958, prompted by the growth of international
commerce, Congress created a Commission on International Rules of
258. See Smit, supra note 17, at 155 ("[Ijt would appear fair to say that Congress'
wholesale adoption, without any change whatsoever, of the legislative proposals and the
explanatory notes accompanying them lends considerable force to the argument that the
intent of the dominant draftsman of these texts should be given appropriate weight."
(emphasis added)).
259. See id. at 154 ("1 also drafted the report eventually submitted to the President and
the Congress and the explanatory notes to the various legislative provisions proposed.").
260. See S. REP. No. 88-1580, at 7 (1964), reprintedin 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3788
("In view of the constant growth of administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings all over the
world, the necessity for obtaining evidence in the United States may be as impelling before a
foreign administrative tribunal or quasi-judicial agency as in proceedings before a
conventional foreign court."); Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 248-49 ("Notably, Congress deleted
the words 'in any judicial proceeding pending in any court in a foreign country,' and
replaced them with the phrase 'in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal."'
(emphasis in original)).
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Judicial Procedure . . . "to investigate and study existing practices of
judicial assistance and cooperation between the United States and
foreign countries with a view to achieving improvements. ,6

This quoted opinion highlights two points. First, there was a growth of
Second, Congress continued to expand the
international commerce. 6
In
scope of § 1782 to address the growth of international commerce. 6
sum, Congress was concerned that the district courts were not equipped
with the legislative tools to respond to the growth of international
cormmerce. 2 64 Hans Smit and the International Rules Committee created a
more robust, expansive, and inclusive § 1782 in light of Congress's
mandate to "investigate and study existing practices of judicial assistance
and cooperation between the United States and foreign countries with a

view to achieving improvements.

265

B. The Goal Defined: A Robust, Expansive, and Inclusive §~ 1782
The 1964 amendments replaced the phrase "any judicial proceeding"
with "a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal. 26 6 Congress
understood that change to "provide the possibility of U.S. judicial
assistance in connection with administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings
abroad., 267 In other words, Congress intended to expand the scope of
§ 1782 to include private arbitral bodies when it added the term
"tribunal. 26 ' The Senate Report supports this interpretation:
261. Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 247-48 (emphasis in original) (citations omnitted).
262. See Jones, supra note 225, at 516 (noting the growth of international commerce).
263. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 260 (2004)
(noting that the 1964 Amendments liberalized § 1782).
264. See S. REP. No. 88-1580, at 3 ("The steadily growing involvement of the United
States in international intercourse and the resulting increase in litigation with international
aspects have demonstrated the necessity for statutory improvements and other devices to
facilitate the conduct of such litigation.").
265. Id at 12; see also Smit, supra note 17, at 155 ("[T]he word 'tribunal' . clearly
encompass[es] private arbitral tribunals ... [Tihe choice of that term was deliberate so as to
depart from the text used in the legislation that was amended .. , and that the purpose of
Section 1782 was to make assistance available on the most liberal terms.").
266. See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 248-49 ("Notably, Congress deleted the words 'in any
judicial proceeding pending in any court in a foreign country,' and replaced them with the
phrase 'in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal."' (emphasis in original)).
267. Id.at 258.
268. See Smit, supra note 17, at 157 ("The substitution of the word 'tribunal' for 'court'
was deliberate, for the drafters wanted to make the assistance provided for available to all
bodies with adjudicatory fu~nctions.").
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In view of the constant growth of administrative and quasi-judicial
proceedings all over the world, the necessity for obtaining evidence in
the United States may be as impelling before a foreign administrative
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency as in proceedings before a conventional
foreign court. Subsection (a) [of § 1782] therefore provides the
possibility of U.S. judicial assistance in connection with all such
proceedings. Finally, the assistance made available by subsection (a) [of
§ 1782] is also269extended to international tribunals and litigants before

such tribunals.

Some district courts, however, reject this interpretation and argue that
the quoted language above only includes public arbitral bodies .27 0 But,
there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that the 1964
amendments were meant to exclude private arbitral bodies.2 Actually, the
entire legislative history suggests that the 1964 Amendments are meant to
be robust, expansive, and inclusive. 7 The Senate Report's Statement sets
this tone right away: "Enactment of the bill into law will constitute a major
step in bringing the United States to the forefront of nations adjusting their
procedures to those of sister nations and thereby providing equitable and
efficacious procedures for the benefit of tribunals and litigants involved in
litigation with international aspects." 7 '
Furthermore, the Senate Report noted, "[tlhe proposed revision of
section 1782 ... clarifie[d] and liberalize[d] existing U.S. procedures for
assisting foreign and international tribunals and litigants in obtaining oral
and documentary evidence in the United States. 7 This statement makes
two points. First, when Congress replaced the phrase "any judicial
proceeding" with "a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal," it
clarified existing U.S. procedures.21 As Smit noe, "[tlhe substitution of
269. S. REP. No. 88-1580, at 7 (1964), reprintedin 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3788.
270. See Norfolk S. Corp. v. Ace Bermuda Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 2d 882, 885 (N.D. I11.
2009) ("Accordingly, I interpret the Intel Court's reference to 'arbitral tribunals' as including
state-sponsored arbitral bodies but excluding purely private arbitrations.").
271. See Smit, supra note 17, at 159 ("[T]he text of Section 1782, which speaks of aid
to a 'foreign or international tribunal,' on its face, clearly includes a foreign or international
arbitral tribunal.").
272. See id. at 157 ("The substitution of the word 'tribunal' for 'court' was deliberate,
for the drafters wanted to make the assistance provided for available to all bodies with
adjudicatory functions.").
273. S. REP. No. 88-1580, at 1 (emphasis added).
274. Id. at 7.
275. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264 (2004)
(noting that the 1964 Amendments clarified existing procedure because the amendments are
to be interpreted expansively and to give the district courts discretion).
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the word 'tribunal' for 'court' was deliberate, for the drafters wanted to
make the assistance provided for available to all bodies with adjudicatory
functions. Clearly, private arbitral tribunals come within the term the
276
drafters used.",

Second, Congress liberalized § 1782 when it replaced the word "court"
with "tribunal. 27 7 The statutory term "tribunal" is meant to include all
bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions 2 7 8 It would be a hard task to
argue, convincingly, that private arbitral bodies do not exercise quasijudicial functions .279 Moreover, the Intel Court noted, if "Congress had
at a time it was enacting
intended to impose such a sweeping restriction. ...
liberalizing amendments to the statute, [then] it would have included
statutory language to that effect.",2 80 In other words, the Court reads § 1782
as an inclusive statutory provision. 28 ' Meaning, if § 1782 does not
explicitly exclude private arbitral bodies, then they are included. Certainly,
§ 1782's plain text does not exclude private arbitral bodies. 8
VII. The Policy Flaw
The courts that have concluded that private arbitral bodies are outside
the scope of § 1782 have all primarily based their conclusion on the
policies that underlie international arbitration . 28 ' There are three policy
rationales that courts often rely on. First, parties contract for arbitration
because it is a relatively more speedy, efficient, and economical means of

276. Smit, supra note 17, at 157.
277. See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 260 (concluding that the 1964 Amendments
liberalized § 1782).
278. See S. REP. No. 88-1580, at 7 (1964), reprintedin 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3788
("In view of the constant growth of administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings all over the
world, the necessity for obtaining evidence in the United States may be as impelling before a
foreign administrative tribunal or quasi-judicial agency as in proceedings before a
conventional foreign court.").
279. See Smit, supra note 17, at 157 ("Clearly, private arbitral tribunals come within
the term the drafters used.").
280. Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 260.
28 1. See id (noting that § 1782 is to be interpreted broadly).
282. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2006) ("Assistance to foreign and international tribunals
and to litigants before such tribunals.").
283. See, e.g., Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir.
1999) (concluding that § 1782 "was enlarged to further comity among nations, not to
complicate and undermine the salutary device of private international arbitration").
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Second, in the international
dispute resolution than litigation. 8
commnercial context, parties choose arbitration, in part, to avoid the risk of
litigating in foreign countries' courts. 285 Third, because the substance and
procedure of the arbitration is agreed upon in advance, parties to a contract
often bargain for efficient discovery mechanisms, as well as neutral rules
and fora.28 In sum, courts have used policy as the decisive factor in
determining whether or not a private arbitral body constitutes a "tribunal"
under § 1782.28

The Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument. In Intel, the
Court never discussed policy in determining whether or not the DGCompetition constituted a tribunal under § 1782.28 Instead, the Court
noted, policy arguments should be considered when the district court
exercises its discretion .28 9 Thus, courts' reliance on policy is completely
misplaced. Despite Intel, courts continue to deny private arbitral bodies
290
access to § 1782 discovery.
A. Legislative Silence?

Enactment of the 1964 Amendments into law, the Senate Report
concluded, "will constitute a major step in bringing the United States to the
284. See, e.g., id ("Arbitration is intended as a speedy, economical, and effective
means of dispute resolution.").
285. See, e.g., id. ("[A]rbitration's principal advantages may be destroyed if the parties
succumb to fighting over burdensome discovery requests far from the place of arbitration.").
286. See, e.g., id. ("[Bloth the substance and procedure for arbitration can be agreed
upon in advance.").
287. See, e.g., Norfolk S. Corp. v. Ace Bermuda Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 2d 882, 885 (N.D.
111.2009) (concluding that "[wihile the private arbitral tribunal at issue here likely falls
within the scope of 'all bodies exercising adjudicatory powers,"' it still is not a tribunal
under § 1782 because of the purpose of international arbitration agreements).
288. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258 (2004)
(holding that the DG-Competition is a tribunal under § 1782 because the tribunal is a "firstinstance decisionmaker" that conducts adjudicatory proceedings which lead to a dispositive
ruling).
289. See id at 264 (noting "a district court is not required to grant a § 1782(a) discovery
application simply because it has the authority to do so" and providing factors that should
bear consideration in ruling on a § 1782(a) request).
290. See, e.g., Comisi6n Ejecutiva, Hidroeldctrica del Rio Lempa v. El Paso Corp., 617
F. Supp. 2d 481, 487 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (holding that Intel shed no light on the issue of
whether § 1782(a) discovery was available to parties to private foreign arbitrations and
under the controlling precedent of Biedermann International, the Court has no power to
grant § 1782 discovery).
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forefront of nations adjusting their procedures to those of sister nations and
thereby providing equitable and efficacious procedures for the benefit of
tribunals and litigants involved in litigation with international aspects."2 '
The Senate Report statement illustrates Congress's intent: The 1964
Amendments were to be robust, expansive, and inclusive.2 9 There is no
evidence to suggest that private international arbitral bodies were to be
excluded from § 1782's scope .293 "If Congress had intended to impose such
a sweeping restriction .. . at a time when it was enacting liberalizing
amendments to the statute, [then] it would have included statutory language
to that effect."2 94 Furthermore, as Smit noted, "the word 'tribunal' clearly
29 5
encompass[es] private arbitral tribunals.
Courts and scholars, however, disagree with this statutory reading.2 9
The legislative history's silence with respect to private tribunals, the
Second Circuit concluded, "is especially telling because we are confident
that a significant congressional expansion of American judicial assistance
to international arbitral panels created exclusively by private parties would
not have been lightly undertaken by Congress. 297 In support of a narrower
reading of § 1782, courts and scholars offer two main arguments.
First, "[t]he context of U.S. arbitration law [] suggests that § 1782 was
not intended to apply to private arbitration. 29 8 This argument is based on
the notion that § 1782 provides more discovery than the Federal Arbitration
299
Act (FAA), which governs arbitration conducted in the United States.
Section 1782 allows requests to be made in any district and does not limit
the scope or form of discovery that the court can order.30 Under the FAA,
291. S. REP. No. 88-1580, at 1 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3783
(emphasis added).
292. See Smit, supra note 17, at 157 ("The substitution of the word 'tribunal' for 'court'
was deliberate, for the drafters wanted to make the assistance provided for available to all
bodies with adjudicatory functions.').
293. See id at 159 ("[Tlhe text of Section 1782, which speaks of aid to a 'foreign or
international tribunal,' on its face, clearly includes a foreign or international arbitral
tribunal.").
294. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 260 (2004).
295. Smit, supra note 17, at 155.
296. See, e.g., Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc. v. Bear Steamns& Co., Inc., 165 F.3d 184, 190 (2d
Cir. 1999) (holding § 1782(a) only "cover[s] governmental or intergovernmental arbitral
tribunals and conventional courts and other state-sponsored adjudicatory bodies" and not
private arbitral tribunals).
297. Id.
298. Rothstein, supra note 223, at 72.
299. Id
300. Id.
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arbitrators may summon witnesses and documents only in a district where
they hold hearings.30 Congress, critics conclude, could not have intended
to give international arbitral bodies more access to discovery than domestic
arbitral bodies .30 ' This argument is flawed for two reasons. First, judicial
discretion provides a check on § 1782 discovery requests. 03 Second, the
1964 Amendments were intended to be expansive.t ' It may be true that
§ 1782 is more generous, but that "proves only that [the FAA] should be
amended to provide the same assistance to domestic arbitral tribunals. 0
Second, critics argue that "[r~eferences in the United States Code to
'arbitral tribunals' almost uniformly concern an adjunct of a foreign
government or international agency. 3 06 This argument makes very little
sense. "Both the 'common usage' and 'widely accepted definition' of
'tribunal' include arbitral bodies." 307 Historically, arbitral bodies have
always been considered a tribunal .3 08 For example, William Blackstone
referred to arbitral bodies as a tribunal in Commentaries. 309 Moreover, "[i]f
Congress had intended to impose such a sweeping restriction .. , at a time
when it was enacting liberalizing amendments to the statute, [then] it would
have included statutory language to that effect. 3 10 In other words, it would
have been a simple matter to add the word "governmental" before the word
"tribunal" in the 1964 Amendments had Congress wanted to limit the
statutory term "tribunal.",3 11 Understanding these weak arguments, courts
and scholars turn to policy.

3 01. Id.
302. Id
303. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 260 (2004)
(holding that district courts have discretion in granting § 1782 discovery).
304. See id (concluding that the 1964 Amendments liberalized § 1782).
305. See Smit, supra note 17, at 160 (proposing that Congress should amend the FAA
to emulate § 1782).
306. Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d 880, 882 (5th Cir. 1999).
307. In re Application of Roz Trading Ltd., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1225 (N.D. Ga.
2006).
308. See id (noting the historical uses of the word tribunal).
309. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *7 (1787).
310. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 260 (2004).
311. See In re Application of Roz Trading Ltd, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 1226 n.3 ("Had
Congress wanted to impose the limitation advanced by Respondent, it would have been a
simple matter to add the word 'governmental' before the word 'tribunal' in the 1964
Amendment.").
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B. The Wrong Analysis
The courts that have concluded that private arbitral bodies are outside
the scope of § 1782 have all employed the same analytical framework .
The basic analytical framework looks similar to this: First, .the court
concludes the legislative history is silent on the issue whether international
arbitral bodies constitute a § 1782 tribunal. 1 Next, the court looks at the
policy rationales underlying international arbitration. Here, the court
determines that international arbitration is intended as a speedy,
economical, and effective means of dispute resolution. 1 Finally, the court
concludes that § 1782 "was enlarged to further comity among nations, not
to complicate and undermine the salutary device of private international
arbitration. 3 15 This analytical framework suffers from one fundamental
flaw: Policy should only be considered when the district court is
determining whether or not to exercise its discretion. 1 Policy concerns are
legitimate, and the Supreme Court provided a sound analytical framework
to address these concerns in Intel."'7
VIII The Proposal
In order to resolve the district court split, this Note proposes a
comprehensive solution that provides a sound judicial framework for
analyzing § 1782 petitions. The starting point to this solution is to provide
a workable definition of what constitutes a "tribunal." Next, this Note
312. See, e.g., Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc. v. Bear Steams & Co., Inc., 165 F.3d 184, 191 (2d
Cir. 1999) ("In sum, policy considerations of some magnitude reinforce our
conclusion .... )
313. See id. at 190 ("The legislative history's silence with respect to private tribunals is
especially telling because we are confident that a significant congressional expansion of
American judicial assistance to international arbitral panels created exclusively by private
parties would not have been lightly undertaken by Congress.. .. ")
314. See Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir.
1999) ("Arbitration is intended as a speedy, economical, and effective means of dispute
resolution.").
315. Id
316. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258 (2004)
(noting that policy should be considered when the district court is exercising its discretion
and not looking at policy rationales when considering whether the disputed arbitral body
constitutes a tribunal).
317. See id. (concluding that policy should only be used when the court is exercising its
discretion).
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proposes a two-step judicial framework to determine whether or not to
grant a § 1782 petition. Finally, this Note proposes a statutory amendment
to § 1782 which would require district courts to make specific findings
when exercising their discretion.
A. TribunalDefined
The starting point of this Note proposal is to define a "tribunal." In
Intel, the Court had to determine whether or not the DG-Competition
constituted a "tribunal.0 1 8 The Court concluded that the DG-Competition
was a "tribunal" because they are "first-instance decisionmaker[s]" that
319
conduct adjudicatory proceedings which lead to a "dispositive" ruling.
Intel's analytical framework provides a two-prong test to determine what
constitutes a tribunal: (1) whether the international arbitral bodies are
"first-instance decisionmaker[s]," and (2) whether the arbitral body
conducts adjudicatory proceedings that lead to a dispositive ruling.3 2
International commercial arbitration is the "accepted way of resolving
international business disputes [between private parties] .... One estimate
is that ninety percent of all international contracts contain arbitration
clauses. 3 21 When a conflict arises, parties submit their disputes, in the first
instance, to the arbitral body for resolution. 2 The arbitral body is the firstinstance decisionmaker. In resolving the dispute, the arbitral body will
conduct adjudicatory proceedings. 2
Those proceedings will lead to a
dispositive ruling.324 Thus, under the proposed two-prong test, private
international arbitral bodies constitute a "tribunal" because they are firstinstance decisionmakers that conduct adjudicatory proceedings which lead
to a dispositive ruling.
The proposed two-prong test is consistent with Congress's intent.
Congress intended to create a robust, inclusive, and expansive § 1782
discovery device. The two-prong tribunal test proposed is meant to be
robust, inclusive, and expansive so that the United States remains at the
'forefront of nations .. . providing equitable and efficacious procedures for
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

See id. (determ-ining whether or not the DG-Competition is a "tribunal").
Id.
Id
Drahozal, supra note 4, at 94.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the benefit of tribunals and litigants involved in litigation with international

aspects.0

25

The two-prong tribunal test, however, does have limits. Not all
alternative dispute resolution bodies will constitute a tribunal under the
proposed two-prong tribunal test. For example, a mediation body will not
constitute a tribunal under § 1782.
Some international commercial
transactions contain a contractual clause that refers disputes to mediation.
The mediator, arguably, is a first-instance decisionmaker since it facilitates
the dispute between the parties. 2 6 Assuming arguendo, that a mediation
body is a first instance decisionmaker, the mediation body fails prong two.
Mediation is a voluntary, confidential, nonbinding, facilitated negotiation in
which a mediator assists the parties in reaching a consensual resolution of a
dispute on terms that the parties themselves agree upon. 2 The mediator
has no authority to impose an outcome on the parties and only controls the
process of the mediation itself, not the results.32 Furthermore, Congress
did not intend for § 1782 to be used for parties to gain leverage in later
negotiations. Thus, a mediation body does not conduct adjudicatory
proceedings that lead to a dispositive ruling.
B. The Two-Step
This Note proposes a two-step judicial framework to detenmine
whether or not to grant a § 1782 petition. The first step: District courts
should ensure basic § 1782 statutorily required elements are satisfied. The
second step: District courts should apply Intel's discretionary guidance test
when exercising their discretion in deciding § 1782 petitions.
The First Step: There are three basic § 1782 statutorily required
elements: (1) that the person from whom discovery is sought reside (or be
found) in the district to which the application is made, (2) discovery be for
use in a proceeding before a foreign tribunal, and (3) be made by a foreign
or international tribunal or any interested person .329 Under the third
325. S. REP. No. 88-1580, at 1 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3783
(emphasis added).
326. See John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith
Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. Ruv. 69, 71 (2002)
(discussing the different capacities of a mediator).
327. See id. (noting the characteristics of mediation).
328. See id. (discussing the role of the mediator).
329. See In re Application of Hallmark Capital Corp., 534 F. Supp. 2d 951, 954 (D.
Minn. 2007) (noting the three basic § 1782 statutory required elements).
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element, the district court must apply the two-prong tribunal test. All of the
pertinent words have been defined either by the Court or this Note. The
first element requires only that a person reside or be found in the district. 30
The second element requires only that a dispositive ruling be within
reasonable contemplation. 3 3 1 The third element requires that the two-prong
tribunal test be satisfied, or is made by an interested person. An interested
person is any person with a reasonable interest in obtaining judicial
assistance. 3
Second Step: Intel provided a discretionary guidance test that all

district courts should

follow. 333

The Court enumerated several factors

district courts should consider when exercising their discretion. 3 First, the
district court should decide whether discovery is being sought from a party
to the proceedings. 3 The need for judicial assistance is "not as apparent"
where discovery is sought from a party to the foreign proceeding, since the
tribunal itself can order parties to produce evidence. 3 Discovery sought
from nonparties, however, may only be obtainable pursuant to § 1782
because the nonparty is out of the jurisdiction of the foreign tribunal. 3
Second, the district court "may take into account the nature of the foreign
tribunal, the character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the
receptivity of the foreign government or the court or agency abroad to U.S.
federal-court judicial assistance. 3 38 For example, a court could consider
whether the § 1782 petition constitutes an attempt to make an end-run
around "foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign
country or the United States."3 39 Third, the district court should consider
330.
331.

28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2006).

335.

Id

336.
337.
338.
339.

Id
Id
Id
Id at 265.

See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 259 (2004)
("[Section] 1782(a) requires only that a dispositive ruling .. , be within reasonable
contemplation.").
332. See id. at 257 ("'[Amny interested person' is 'intended to include not only litigants
before foreign or international tribunals, but also foreign and international officials as well as
any other person whether he be designated by foreign law or international convention or
merely possess a reasonable interest in obtaining the assistance."'I).
333. See id at 264 ("[A] district court is not required to grant a § 1782(a) discovery
application simply because it has the authority to do so.").
334. See id ("We note below factors that bear consideration in ruling on a § 1782(a)
request.").
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whether the request is "unduly intrusive or burdensome," and whether such
request should be narrowed. 3
This step is the appropriate place for district courts to consider the
policy rationales underlying international arbitration. For example, courts
can determine that a party is only seeking § 1782 discovery to drive up

litigation

costs. 341'

Thus, § 1782 discovery would be inappropriate. All of

these factors, the Intel Court noted, are supported by Hans Smit and the
legislative history of § 1782 .342 Also, this step provides adequate protection
to third-parties. For example, the court could find that the § 1782 discovery
request is unduly burdensome or intrusive on the third-party and thus deny
the § 1782 petition.
Under this proposed framework, however, district courts could just
import the broad policy rationales behind international commercial
arbitration into this step to conclude that § 1782 discovery is inappropriate.
In other words, this Note's proposal could just bring the district court fight
to a different arena. To prevent this, this Note proposes a statutory
amendment to § 1782 which would require district courts to make specific
findings when exercising their discretion.
C Statutory Amendment: Providing Teeth to the Two-Step
In order to give the two-step teeth, this Note proposes a statutory
amendment to § 1782. The proposed amendment is as follows: "The
district court must make specific findings when exercising its discretion
under this statute." This amendment would have the effect of forcing
district courts to be more diligent when exercising their discretion under the
two-step judicial framework. Under this statute, a court cannot just decline
a § 1782 petition because it undermines the policy rationales underlying
international arbitration. Instead, a court can decline a § 1782 petition if it
specifically finds, after reviewing the facts, that the § 1782 petition would
be unduly intrusive. For example, a court can find that a party's § 1782
petition to depose a third party is unduly intrusive.

340.
34 1.
342.

Id
Id
See id (citing and quoting both Hans Smit and the Senate Report as authority).
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1. The Goal Achieved
The goal of the 1964 amendments was to create a robust, inclusive,
and expansive § 1782. The proposed two-step is what Congress envisioned
in 1964. Congress wanted the United States to remain at the "fobrefront of
nations...providing equitable and efficacious procedures for the benefit of
43
tribunals and litigants involved in litigation with international aspects.
This proposal explicitly includes private international arbitral bodies within
the scope of § 1782. Furthermore, it gives the court the discretion, which
was recognized by the Supreme Court in Intel, to determine whether
discovery is appropriate under the specific facts. Moreover, the proposed
statutory amendment ensures that courts are not importing broad policy
rationales to deny § 1782 petitions because the court must make specific
findings when exercising its discretion.
Additionally, this proposal provides adequate protection to the parties
involved in the dispute and third parties. If the court finds that the § 1782
petition would be unduly intrusive to a third party or is being sought from a
party to the arbitral proceedings, then the court should deny the petition.
Furthermore, the two-step allows the court to consider whether future (not
yet developed) alternative dispute resolution tribunals would constitute a
tribunal under the two-prong tribunal test. All of these features provide a
robust, inclusive, and expansive judicial framework to analyze § 1782
petitions.
2. The Last Resort
If the two-step is not adopted, then Congress should make its intent
even more explicit by amending the statute to include private international
arbitral bodies. This can simply be done by adding the words "whether
judicial, administrative, or arbitral be it private or public" after the statutory
language "for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal."
The proposed amendment to § 1782 would read as follows:
The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found
may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a
document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or
international tribunal, whether judicial, administrative, or arbitral be it
private orpublic....
343. S. REP. No. 88-1580, at 1 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.G.C.A.N. 3782, 3783
(emphasis added).
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This proposal, however, should be the last resort for three reasons.
First, Congress intended the 1964 amendments to be robust, inclusive,
and expansive. This last resort proposal could be interpreted as providing
an exhaustive list of what constitutes a tribunal. If this occurs, the court
will be limited to granting petitions from judicial, administrative, and
arbitral tribunals. For example, this proposal would explicitly exclude
quasi-judicial tribunals. This is inconsistent with Congress's intent. In
view of the constant growth of administrative and quasi-judicial
proceedings all over the world, the Senate Report noted, "the necessity for
obtaining evidence in the United States may be as impelling before a
foreign administrative tribunal or quasi-judicial agency as in proceedings
before a conventional foreign court. Subsection (a) [of § 1782] therefore
provides the possibility of U.S. judicial assistance in connection with all

such proceedings."04"
Certainly, Congress could include all quasi-judicial and quasiadministrative tribunals by explicitly writing it into § 1782. But, this is
exactly what Congress wanted to prevent when it amended § 1782.
Specifically, Congress did not want to have to keep amending § 1782 every
time a new alternative dispute resolution tribunal is created to resolve
disputes among international parties. The last resort proposal, however,
will explicitly include private international arbitral bodies. Thus, the last
resort proposal provides a solution that will resolve the current split. Still,
the last resort proposal would not be completely consistent with Congress's
intent due to its probable need for future amendments to maintain its
expansive scope.
Second, the last resort proposal could present the same definitional
problem of what constitutes a tribunal. For example, some district courts
might interpret the last resort proposal as providing an exhaustive list of
what constitutes a tribunal, while other district courts might interpret it as
providing examples of what constitutes a tribunal. If this occurs, a
comprehensive solution-similar to the proposed two-step-would have to
be developed.
Finally, the last resort proposal would undermine the Court's Intel
decision. The Court interpreted § 1782 as a liberal and expansive statute.34
For example, the Court held that "[tlhe language of § 1782(a), confirmed by
its context. ...warrants this conclusion: The statute authorizes, but does
344.

Id. at 7.

345. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 260 (2004)
(concluding that the 1964 Amendments liberalized § 1782).
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not require, a federal district court to provide assistance ....
This
quoted language provides the precedent that gives district courts the
discretion to grant or deny § 1782 petitions. If Congress adopted the last
resort proposal, then it would restrict the entire meaning of the statute.
Thus, Intel's precedential authority would be in question. In other words,
under the last resort proposal, the preliminary issue of whether a court has
the discretion to grant or deny § 1782 petitions would need to be
determined. This is particularly problematic for two reasons.
First, parties to the arbitration agreement will have no protection from
abuses of § 1782 discovery if the court interprets the last resort proposal as
overruling Intel. If the court reaches the conclusion that Intel is overruled
by the last resort proposal, then the court cannot exercise any discretion
under § 1782. Meaning, parties can seek discovery without any constraints
because the last resort proposal explicitly includes private arbitral tribunals.
Second, third parties will also have no protection under the last resort
proposal. Once the court concludes that the § 1782 petition is sought by a
party from an international arbitral tribunal, the court must grant discovery.
A third-party cannot challenge on the grounds that the discovery would be
unduly intrusive.
D. A Hypothetical: The Two-Step Proposalat Work
Assume that there is a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement.
There is an ongoing arbitration proceeding before the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) between B's Insurance Corporation (Spain)
and J Corporation (Portugal). The underlying dispute involved insurance
coverage for losses incurred in connection with a train derailment in South
Carolina. 4 J Corp. petitions the District Court for the Southern District of
New York, under § 1782(a), to require third-party E (New York), former
counsel to B's Insurance Corp., 4 to appear for a deposition in New York
so that her testimony may be used in connection with the ICC arbitration in
London. E represented B's Insurance Corp. in a similar train derailment
dispute two years ago. There are two issues that the court must determine.
346. Id at 255.
347. The stated facts are similar to the facts found in Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Ace
Bermuda Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 2d 882, 886 (N.D. 11l. 2009), in which the court held that private
arbitral tribunals do not constitute a tribunal under § 1782.
348. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2006) (noting that all confidential communications
between lawyer and client are protected).
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First, whether all the basic elements of § 1782 are satisfied, which includes
the sub-issue of whether the ICC is a "tribunal" under § 1782. If the court
concludes that the elements of § 1782 are satisfied, then the second issue is
whether the court should exercise its discretion to grant the § 1782 petition.
The District Court for the Southern District of New York analysis:
Section 1782 provides for a two-step analysis when reviewing § 1782
petitions for discovery. Step One: The court must ensure that the three
basic elements of § 1782 are satisfied. First, the person from whom
discovery is sought must reside (or be found) in the district to which the
petition is made. Here, this element is easily satisfied because third-party E
resides in NY. Second, the discovery must be for use in a proceeding
before a foreign tribunal. Under these facts, J Corp. is seeking the
deposition of E for use in the proceedings before the ICC. Thus, this
element is satisfied. Third, the ICC must be a foreign or international
tribunal. To determine whether the ICC is a tribunal under § 1782, the
court must apply a two-prong tribunal test. The first prong asks whether the
ICC is a first-instance decisionmaker. The contract between J Corp. and B
Insurance Corp. provides that all disputes be brought to the ICC, in the
first-instance, for resolution. Thus, this prong is satisfied because the ICC
is a first-instance decisionmaker. The second prong asks whether the
arbitral body conducts adjudicatory proceedings that lead to a dispositive
ruling. Surely, the ICC will conduct adjudicatory proceedings between J
Corp. and B Insurance Corp. that will lead to a dispositive ruling by the
ICC. The ICC will review the facts, listen to oral arguments, and will reach
a decision on the merits that is binding on both parties. Both parties must
follow the dispositive outcome. Therefore, the second prong is satisfied.
Step Two: The second step provides that the court apply Intel's
discretionary guidance test. The Intel Court enumerated several factors a
district court should consider when exercising its discretion under § 1782.
Also, in light of the recent amendment to § 1782, the court must make
specific findings when deciding whether to exercise its discretion.
The first factor the district court should consider is whether discovery
is being sought from a party to the proceedings. J Corp. seeks to depose E.
Clearly, E is not a party to the proceeding. Second, the court has to
determine whether the § 1782 petition constitutes an attempt to make an
end-run around "foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of a
foreign country or the United States.0 4 9 B Insurance Corp. asserts that J
Corp.'s § 1782 petition is an attempt to make an end-run around the policies
349. Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 260.

1706

10667 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1659 (2010)

of the United Kingdom. There is no evidence, however, that the United
Kingdom's policies would be offended if the court grants the § 1782
petition.350 Third, the district court should consider whether the request is
unduly intrusive or burdensome, and whether such request should be
narrowed. Third-party E asserts that the § 1782 petition would be unduly
intrusive because E would have to retain an attorney and show up for a
deposition. The court finds that the deposition of E is not unduly intrusive.
One of the purposes behind § 1782 is to provide the optimal level of
judicial assistance to international tribunals. Depositions are a means to
provide judicial assistance to the ICC. E represented B Insurance Corp. two
years ago in a similar train derailment case. Although § 1782 protects
privileged materials, E may have nonprivileged material that is relevant to
the current dispute. Thus, the court grants J Corp.'s § 1782 petition
because of the specific findings outlined above.
E. Any Protections?
Under this proposal, private parties will surely want additional
protection from U.S. style discovery. Although the two-step proposal
provides adequate protection to parties when the court is exercising its
discretion, parties might want complete protection from § 1782 discovery.
After all, this two-step proposal argues that private international arbitral
bodies constitute a tribunal under § 1782. This Note provides two riskassessment options.
First Option: Private parties can put a provision into the contract
which states that "if a dispute shall arise, all parties are not allowed to seek
discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a)." With a provision similar to this, it
becomes very likely that, even if a party secures information under § 1782,
the arbitral body itself will exclude the introduction of the discoverable
materials .3 11 Refusal to consider materials lawfully secured pursuant to a
federal statute, however, "is susceptible to being characterized. . . as
precluding a party from presenting its case. In such a situation, a ruling by
the arbitral tribunal may directly and explicitly trigger application of Article

350. The facts regarding the United Kingdom policies are hypothetical.
351. See Martinez-Fraga, supra note 7, at 93 ("A[n] ... issue arises when the movant
unilaterally prosecutes a § 1782 petition, successfully secures documents and information,
and, upon attempting to introduce these materials into evidence during the arbitration, is
precluded from so proceeding by the arbitral tribunal.").
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Article V(1)(b) proscribes the
V of the New York Convention.""' 2
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award where a party was "unable
to present his case."0 53 Certainly, "the petitioner to the § 1782 application
may have a built-in appellate recourse with substantial and measurable
basis for setting aside the award .. .. Therefore, an arbitral tribunal's
blanket foreclosure of materials secured in accordance with § 1782 runs the
very immediate and material risk of rendering any prospective award

unenforceable.0

54

Second Option: Congress can amend § 1782(a) to read as follows:
Parties are allowed to contract out of this provision subject to the laws of
the United States. Shall parties contract out of this provision, district
courts cannotprevent enforcement under the New York Convention.
This amendment would have the effect of making the parties' intent
paramount. Under this amendment, parties can contract out of § 1782 and
suffer no penalty when enforcing the arbitral award in the United States.
Given the legislative history, however, it seems unlikely that Congress
355
would restrict § 1782 in this way.
Under this option, third parties would also have full protection if
parties contract out of § 1782. Certainly, if parties contract out of § 1782
then there can never be any discovery sought from third-parties. There is,
however, no way to provide statutory protection for third parties. Section
1782 is intended to assist a "foreign tribunal ... with securing documents or
deposition testimony from persons or entities present .. . in the United
States." Providing a statutory amendment to protect third-parties would
render the statute meaningless. This Note's two-step proposal, supported
by the Court's Intel decision, does adequately protect third-parties from
unduly burdensome and intrusive discovery requests.

3 52. Id
353. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 7, 1959, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 30 U.N.T.S. 3 (ratified in the United States
Dec. 29, 1970) (requiring state signatories to recognize and enforce foreign arbitral
agreements and awards).
354. Martinez-Fraga, supra note 7, at 93.
355. See S. REP. No. 88-1580, at 1 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3783
("The steadily growing involvement of the United States in international intercourse and the
resulting increase in litigation with international aspects have demonstrated the necessity for
statutory improvements and other devices to facilitate the conduct of such litigation.").
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IX Conclusion
Just like one should recognize a duck as a duck, proper § 1782 analysis
demands the recognition of private international arbitral tribunals as a
"tribunal." "There simply is no good reason for withholding from private
international tribunals who have been accorded by the body politic the
power to adjudicate controversies . . . the assistance that they may need to
obtain requisite information.0 5 6 Courts that have concluded otherwise,
have mistakenly used policy at the peril of private international arbitral
bodies.
When Congress amended § 1782 it intended to make § 1782 robust,
expansive, and inclusive in order to respond to the growth of international
commerce and disputes. This Note's proposal is what Congress intended,
which is a robust, expansive, and inclusive judicial framework in which
district courts can analyze § 1782 petitions. The two-step framework,
which provides a workable definition of a tribunal, is the approach every
district court should use when considering § 1782 petitions. Also, § 1782
should be amended so that district courts make specific findings when
exercising their discretion. Utilizing these proposals, ducks can be ducks,
and parties subject to international arbitration can have access to § 1782
discovery, which is what Congress intended.

356.

Smit, supra note 17, at 156.

